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JOURNAL OF
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Volume IV · Number 3 · July 1965

Editor's Notes

THE FIRST ARTICLE[1] in this issue concerns Malaysia, a country which has seldom featured in the *Journal* and one from which there is clearly much to be learnt about the art of planning and carrying out development; it is of unusual interest for several reasons.

Perhaps the most striking feature is the priority that is given to development not only in words but in deeds. The Deputy Prime Minister himself, Tun Abdul Razak, is in charge and it is obvious from the article that, far from being a figurehead, he is the inspiration and driving force behind the campaign of development. There is a spirit of urgency and enthusiasm that is all too rare in tackling the many practical problems which beset planners once their plan is forged. There is also a strong military influence which permeates the whole of the administrative side of the operation. Doubtless this is due to the fact that the need for development was born out of dire necessity, the necessity to defend Malaysia from open or covert invasion by subversive force and thought. With its political unity and independence at stake Malaysia has realized that immediate and continuous action must be taken to ensure that so far as possible all its peoples, its ruled as well as its rulers, the lowest strata of society up to the traditional leaders, but especially those living in the rural areas, should enjoy as fully as possible the results of development leading to a steady rise in their basic standards of living.

Another feature which has been strikingly effective is the visual aid technique adapted to the recording in the 'Ops. Room' of what the plan is at each level of the development ladder and how well each project in the plan is progressing. This must be of great benefit particularly at the lower levels where literacy among the members of the development teams or local councils may not be high. In the upper levels it provides a rapid appreciation of successes and failures and encourages early action to overcome obstacles in the development plan. To maintain the 'Ops. Rooms' and all their maps, reports and diagrams constantly up to date requires a minimum of capable and effective staff, and this Malaysia seems to be fortunate to possess. If other countries are not blessed with adequate staff and wish to copy the system it should not, however, be difficult to provide the training required.

There is no doubt that this operation is proving to be a practical success and the question arises whether it is necessary to live under the threat of invasion in order to achieve such exceptional success in development. It certainly should

[1] *The Story of Development in Malaya*, by C. G. Ferguson.

not be so. There are, or ought to be, other incentives as powerful as threats of invasion to gear the whole nation to the primary task of raising all living standards to reasonable levels. What priority development enjoys, where its main emphasis is to be and what supervision, drive and encouragement it should receive is a political decision. Malaysia is an inspiring example how all-embracing this decision can be and how local government units, however small and informal, can and must play their full part from initial consultation on what to develop, to the final acts of completion.

DR. C. K. MEEK

Dr. Charles Kingsley Meek, who died recently aged 80, was best known as the author of "Land Law and Custom in the Colonies", the classic reference book on rural land tenure. He also wrote several books on various aspects of anthropology, law and land tenure in Nigeria, where he was at one time an Administrative Officer. After retiring from the Colonial Service he became a lecturer in anthropology at Oxford, and Senior Research Fellow at Brasenose College.

The Story of Development in Malaya (Now Malaysia)[1]*—Some Aspects*

By C. G. Ferguson.

Background

For twelve years Malaya suffered from the distraction, financial drainage, disruption, and bloodshed caused by active communist terrorism. During this time its national and rural development were almost at a standstill. All funds, energies and government capacity which should have been focused on the task of development had to be concentrated on the task of prosecuting the Emergency towards the elimination of active militant communism.

Also during this Emergency, particularly in the rural areas, which were covered by military and police curfews and in which movement was restricted to security forces, all the pre-requisites for development such as soil, mineral and timber surveys together with the opening up of new land for agriculture, came to a standstill, though development in urban areas continued.

In August, 1960, the Emergency was declared to be officially at an end (although a few isolated groups of communist terrorists remained on the Malayan-Thai border) and, co-incidental with the ending of the Emergency, positive action on the implementation of development was launched. The battle against militant communism had been won; the battle to build a new nation was about to begin.

Basic thinking

Plans for development had already been prepared; now was the time for their launching and their implementation. It is easy to make plans on paper; it is more difficult to translate these plans into positive tangible projects on the ground. It is even more difficult to maintain and sustain day-to-day force and drive to ensure that results in development are quickly achieved.

Malaya is a Federation, and to its legislature, the Federal Parliament, members are elected by the voters of its fourteen states. Each state also has its own Legislative Assembly, elected by voters in that state. Federal constituencies correspond in most cases to the size of a district, while state constituencies are usually sub-divisions of federal constituencies. The Federal Prime Minister and Cabinet have as their state counterparts the Chief Minister and Executive Council.

The constitution divides legislation into three categories: federal, state and concurrent matters. This means that the closest co-ordination and the closest co-operation must be obtained if results in development are to be achieved.

In launching the Development Plan, a considerable bias had to be given towards rural development to bring balance to the country's economy, so that economic conditions and the standard of living in the rural areas did not lag

[1] Although the Development Plan described in this article originally applied only to Malaya, it has since been extended to cover the Borneo territories.

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behind but would be improved at the same pace as industrial, urban and town development.

Defects of the Past

In the past neither the rural nor the urban people had the best that could have been given to them for many reasons:

(1) Inter-departmental jealousy in the course of day-to-day execution of government functions; conflicting departmental policies on the ground in the rural areas.

(2) Lack of co-ordination between departments in what they were trying to do for the rural areas.

(3) Lack of complete day-to-day co-operation between government officers due mostly to a lack of understanding of each other's task.

(4) Every department thinking its own function was the most important. In other words, too many priorities all pulling at cross purposes and leading nowhere.

(5) Lack of proper planning in the departments and of a master plan at all levels for the purpose of achieving the maximum development in the rural areas.

(6) Lack of sufficient directive control at the top to ensure that government in the rural areas functioned as an efficient machine manned by a purposeful, single-minded team, and driven towards one goal only, that of rural development.

All these had tended, in the past, to decrease the efficiency of government and hamper development. The first essential was the eradication of such obstacles.

First requirement

The first requirement of any battle (and Malaya's Development Plan was viewed by all as a battle, a challenge, or a second Emergency) is good leadership. The country was fortunate in having this first requirement, good leadership, provided by the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Haji Abdul Razak bin Hussein.

With the launching of development the Deputy Prime Minister, notwithstanding his additional duties as Minister of Defence, shouldered the added responsibilities of Minister of National and Rural Development. He launched a dynamic and far-sighted development programme, designed to stabilize the country economically, socially and politically. His power of decision, his thinking and planning together with his ability to put his plans into action produced for Malaya a pattern of development unique in the history of new and independent developing nations.

He made, and quickly implemented, the following decisions:

(*a*) Directives: that the development programme would be implemented by clear-cut directives.

(*b*) Development Teams: that at district, state and federal levels development teams would be established to work together on the implementation of development projects.

(*c*) Development Operations Rooms: that each development team, at each level, would set up and maintain a development operations room.

(*d*) Spotlighting Delays: that a new system of day-to-day reporting of progress would be adhered to, so that delays on projects could be easily spotlighted and the reasons for them quickly diagnosed.

(*e*) Time Factor: that time was short and that every moment must be used to the full.

(*f*) Results: that results *must* be achieved and that there was no place for doubt that the development plan would succeed.

(*g*) Phases: that the development programme would be launched in phases, one at a time, but running concurrently.

(*h*) Red Book: that each district development team would forthwith prepare and complete a "Red Book" plan for its district.

Directives

It should be remembered that at the time of launching the Plan, shortly after independence, there was a run down of administrative, technical and professional staff because of an outflow of expatriates leaving on malayanization. This did not mean, however, that the plan could not be implemented because in every state and in every district there were first class young Malayan officers, mostly university graduates, competent to implement the Plan; where they lacked experience they were amply compensated by good professional qualifications and the ability to work hard in a spirit of dedication to the nation—all they needed, as the Deputy Prime Minister foresaw, were clear-cut directives to get on with the job.

In addition, in implementing national development by a federal government through no less than fourteen state governments it was essential that everyone, from the top to bottom of the government structure, had a clear-cut picture of the Government's aims and aspirations in development.

The following is the *First Directive* issued on rural development:

"*Aim*

The declared and determined aim of the Government is that, for the next five years, the absolute maximum effort will be concentrated on the development of the country with emphasis first and foremost, on rural economic development.

Scope of aim

Everything possible will be done to

(*a*) give the rural community the pride of place which is its due,

(*b*) prepare the way for the prosperity of the rural dweller by providing a sound economic foundation for his way of life, his agricultural livelihood, and for the economic development of his rural industries,

(*c*) encourage and foster a striving towards economic stability and prosperity among the rural community by providing every stimulus and incentive available, and so raise the standard of living in the rural areas,

(*d*) provide the essential amenities of Malayan life to the rural dweller,

(*e*) focus the existing services of government, with full pressure co-ordinated execution, towards the betterment of the living conditions of the rural community,

(*f*) educate, convince and inspire the rural dweller that the productivity, progress and prosperity of the nation is in fact the sum total of individual effort by each and every son of the land; and so put the onus of the future advancement of the nation squarely on his shoulders and make him feel that the destiny of Malaya, without doubt, is in his own hands,

(*g*) promote the cultural development of the rural community.

Method of achieving aim

(*a*) All policies, at all levels, ministerial, federal, state, and district will in future be framed with a priority focus on this aim of rural development.

(*b*) All the resources of government, and the entire energies of government executive effort, will be harnessed and directed towards this aim; the complete machinery of government will be geared into a singularity of purpose and action to achieve it.

(*c*) The same high standard of intensive integration and close co-ordination of all government forces which contributed so much to the success of the campaign against communist terrorism, and the same method of purposeful planning and efficient execution which was so apparent during the Emergency will be the keynote of positive action in this vital and most important campaign.

From Plans	Federal Cabinet
↓	↓
One Aim	National Development Planning Committee
↓	(All ministries co-ordinated)
One Policy	↓
↓	State Rural Development Committee
One Plan	(All departments co-ordinated)
↓	↓
One Team	District Rural Development Committees
↓	↓
One Heart	All officers working as a team on the ground with full support from above".
↓	
To Results	

Development teams

In the application of increased technical knowledge government officers tend to become more and more specialized in their departmental outlook; they are sometimes unable to see the picture of national development plans as a whole. This tendency of technical specialization can result in a wastage of many hours, dealing with projects from each of the various technical viewpoints.

It can also result in excessive paper work where there is a strong conflict of technical views, and during the time that such verbal and written conflicts are in progress, development on the ground is delayed. Sometimes action on the project may even stop altogether.

Nowadays, there is no development project which can be implemented entirely by the action of only one department. Nearly all projects require the co-ordination, co-operation and combined action by many departments in order to be implemented.

One of the best methods of remedying the defects of excessive specialization, and of preventing experts from blowing their own "technical trumpet" too loudly is to make sure that each and every officer in all departments of government concerned with development has a knowledge, not only of his own particular job but also of the overall development plan and of the functions of other departments, so that he will be able to see the whole plan in perspective.

Malaya had inherited several ultra-bureaucratic tendencies. In pre-independence days the average government officer was promoted or demoted on his

DIAGRAM No. 1

FEDERAL, STATE, DISTRICT and VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEES and DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS ROOMS



Operations Rooms and Development Teams at all Levels.

National Operations Room	1
State Operations Rooms	13
District/Sub/District Operations Rooms	100
Total	114

KEY

1 — State Development Committee in state Development Operations Room.

2 — District Development Committee in District Development Operations Room.

3 3 3 — Village Development Committee.

Notes:

a. Village Development Committees have a small Development Operations Map in their Community Centres.

b. Singapore, being mostly industrial in development had its own method started before Malaysia.

ability, or inability, to write nice-looking minutes on files and not split infinitives. There was also a tendency to focus too much attention on files and paper work, forgetting the main aim of getting on with work on the ground.

Also, under a democratic and elected government with both federal and state members of parliament in each district, there was a tendency, a forgivable tendency, for politicians to promise the electorate all sorts of projects first and then to turn to the Administration and ask for the promised projects to be implemented without any regard to their feasibility.

The Deputy Prime Minister therefore, decided to establish, at federal, state and district levels, development teams consisting at each level of all the heads of government departments responsible for development, together with the elected members of parliament (and of state assemblies) for the area concerned, in order to:

(*a*) Obtain the maximum co-ordination of all government officers concerned with the implementation of development;
(*b*) cut down unnecessary paper work and red tape;
(*c*) ensure that there was complete co-operation between government officers and members of parliament;
(*d*) ensure that everyone concerned with development was fully in the picture, not only regarding his own specific task, but with every aspect of government policy and could realize, in perspective, where his work lay within the broader "mosaic" of the national Plan;
(*e*) ensure that difficulties, delays and conflicts in implementation could be quickly thrashed out at all levels and the task proceeded with at speed;
(*f*) apply the dictum that it does not matter who you are, where you are, what you are—the only thing that matters on these development teams is to implement development projects as quickly as possible. Results are what is required.

The composition of these teams, which were later extended down to village level, was as follows:

Federal Level. All ministers concerned with development (supported by a planning committee of senior officials).

State Level. Chairman: Chief Minister of the State. Members: all heads of state departments together with the elected members of the State Executive Council.

District Level. Chairman: District Officer. Members: district heads of departments together with the elected State Assembly representatives for that district.[1]

Kampong (Village) Level. Chairman: *Ketua Kampong* or headman. Members: four or five selected leaders within the village.

The following is a short extract from a directive on how to conduct their business:

"The purpose of meetings is, by discussion:
(1) to examine given problems/proposals for development;
(2) to ensure that no aspect of such problems/proposals has been ignored;
(3) to reach agreement;
(4) to decide necessary action.

[1] Although this article deals with rural development, it should perhaps be pointed out here that the development plans of municipalities and autonomous town councils are co-ordinated at state level through the State Development Committee.

TEAM SPIRIT
(English translation of a Malay poem)

High mountains, we'll climb together,
Deep seas, *united* we'll swim,
Let us, with *one* heart, endeavour
To overcome our difficulties—and win ! "

See Diagram No. 1 on page 153.

Development operations rooms

All development teams at all levels were given an instruction to set up, and make day-to-day use of, a development operations room.

Federal and state headquarters operations rooms are fairly large and elaborate, whereas at district headquarters they may be part of the district officer's own office. Nevertheless, the lay-out, design and principle are the same in all cases. All team meetings at all levels are held in these rooms.

Maps and charts on sliding rollers are the focal point in every operations room. There is at least one map for each government department, showing clearly the location, details, and stage of progress of each project under construction. Each team meeting is preceded by a "briefing" on development progress, project by project, with emphasis not so much on progress but on projects which have been delayed and run into difficulties.

As the Deputy Prime Minister has said: "The purpose of these development operations rooms is not to keep one's finger on the pulse of progress where the pulse is beating, but rather to be able to put one's finger on the places where the pulse of development has stopped beating, so that an accurate diagnosis of difficulties and delays can be carried out, and the defects rectified with speed."

The staff required to maintain these operations rooms generally consists only of a young clerk or draftsman, because it has been laid down that each head of department or each officer responsible for a project will maintain and keep up to date his own maps. The reason for pinning down this responsibility to the officers concerned is that if they find that the map is wrong or the project wrongly located, then they alone are to blame. It has become routine drill that when a Federal Minister or the Chief Minister of a State tours development projects, he will first visit the development operations room in the area and get a clear and comprehensive briefing of progress before going out on the ground to inspect work.

Normally, during such briefings the departmental officers do not know which projects the minister will inspect. This means that briefings on progress must be accurate and truthful, because the inspecting Minister, after the briefing, may drive straight out to see for himself. Seldom, nowadays, do officers give an inaccurate briefing for fear of being caught out.

The federal and some of the state operations rooms are fitted with recording machinery and each briefing by departmental officers in front of ministers is taped. But, happily, few recordings have had to be used as a play-back in evidence against an inaccurate brief. Nevertheless, this record is a very useful source of information when required in the future.

The main object of these briefings in operations room is to bring to the surface existing problems and difficulties so that they can be thrashed out and a decision given on the spot, without recourse to unnecessary delay in letter-

DIAGRAM NO. 2

HOW A DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS ROOM WORKS

MAPS AND CHARTS FOR EVERY PROJECT UNDER IMPLEMENTATION

MAP Civil Aviation Projects	MAP Industries Projects	MAP New Road Construction	CHART Health Programme	MAP Education Programme	MAP DID Projects	MAP Land Development Projects	CHART New Electric Supply Construction	MAP Port Services Projects	MAP Water Supply Projects	MAP Port Harbour Construction	MAP etc., etc.


Each Officer gives a "brief" in front of his map
Dir. of Edu.
Road Engr.
Water Engr.
Dir. of Med. Ser.
Dir. of Civil Avia.
Irrigation Engr.
Industries off.
Drainage Engr.
ETC.
ETC.
Brief addressed to Minister of Development
Decisions
After consultation with fellow Ministers and Advisers, decisions given on the spot.
Try Officials, Economists, Planning Experts, etc.
Minister of Health
Minister of Works
Minister of National Dev.
Minister of Education
other Ministers
Decisions tape-recorded
"Briefing" tape-recorded
OTHER MINISTERS— Briefings on different subjects, sometimes ALL Ministers are present; sometimes only those concerned with the subject.

NOTE:
Same procedure at State and District Level with different Officers and State/Federal Ministers playing part.

DIAGRAM NO. 3

PROGRESS CHART

The main five stages which any project will go through before completion: A, B, C, D, E, F.

A	B	C	D	E	F
Preliminary action and planning—includes obtaining site or land for the project.	Detailed planning—includes any detailed surveys, designing works, detailed plans and specifications or other form of detailed planning or action before commencement of works.	Purchase of equipment—where plant and machinery and other equipment are a necessary part of the project and are to be purchased from the vote of the project.	Tenders and award of contract for works.	Project under construction, installation or implementation.	Project completed.

CHART FOR EVERY PROJECT UNDER IMPLEMENTATION



KEY



Top triangles; filled in at planning stage by officer responsible for project, i.e. on pre-assessment of the stages A,B,C,D,E,F throughout the year.



Bottom triangles; empty at beginning of year but filled in each month giving actual stage reached—from inspection report on the ground.

Note

1. If stage A, B, C, D, E, F, in top triangle coincides with actual stage then both triangles are the same.
2. If stage A, B, C, D, E, F, in bottom triangle is behind schedule then it is shown
3. If stage A, B, C, D, E, F, in bottom triangle is ahead of schedule then it is shown

writing. This does not mean, however, that decisions are not properly recorded for future follow-up action.

See Diagram No. 2 on page 156.

Spotlighting delays

In addition to the maps and charts in each operations room a special form of progress reporting was standardized and put into use throughout the whole country. It is a simple system in which the six main stages that any project will go through from start to finish, are marked A, B, C, D, E, F.

Then for each month of the year a line of double triangles is drawn out. In the top line of triangles the Head of Department responsible for the project plots out the stages, forecasting the progress of the project month by month of the year.

Then, as the project starts, a report of actual progress on the ground is received and the actual stage reached, month by month, is plotted in the corresponding empty triangle beneath the planned projection.

An example of this progress reporting chart is given below.

See Diagram No. 3 on page 157.

If the project falls *behind* schedule the reporting letter is written in *red*. If the project is *ahead* of schedule then the reporting letter is shown in *green*. If the project is exactly *on* schedule then the letter in both triangles is shown in *black*.

In January of every year these progress charts are compiled into booklets, state by state, project by project, and as reports flow in giving progress on the ground, these booklets are kept up-to-date.

This means that at any time the Minister of National Development can see immediately:

(*a*) which projects are behind (by looking for *red* letters);
(*b*) which projects are running to schedule (by looking for *black* letters in both triangles; and
(*c*) which projects are running ahead of schedule (by looking for *green* letters).

When the Minister tours the country inspecting development progress, the only thing he need carry with him is a booklet of these charts showing the latest position on development.

Another advantage of this system of reporting progress is that it makes every officer responsible for every project think and plan ahead accurately, in filling in the top triangles A, B, C, D, E, F. From an assessment of these forward projections it can be clearly seen, in preparing the development estimates for the following year, whether or not funds to be voted for proposed projects will be fully spent or will result in a shortfall.

The moment a red letter shows up, it is a danger signal, and an immediate diagnosis is made to find out the reason for delay.

Time factor

Almost every developing country in the world talks glibly about a five (or six) year development plan.

In five years there are 1,825 days, but, if you deduct all non-working days such as Sundays, half Saturdays, public and religious holidays, and all those days given up to average leave, sickness, bad weather, flooding, breakdowns,

DIAGRAM NO. 4

FIVE YEAR PLAN=1,000 FULL WORKING DAYS



This may be an exaggeration; but one cannot over-emphasize the importance of time

etc. – then a five year plan does not give one a full five years in which to implement development – one really has only 1,000 full working days.

The time factor has been stressed continually by the Deputy Prime Minister in implementing development. To quote his own words,

"There is a Chinese proverb which says that 'an inch of time cannot be bought with an inch of gold'. This is very true. Time is the most valuable and important commodity in the implementation of our five year plan; much more important than money. Funds underspent each year can be revoted by Parliament, but no Parliament in the world can revote lost time!"

See Diagram No. 4 above.

Results

The keynote of action stressed by Tun Razak in all briefings, meetings and speeches on development is concentrated in one word of which he makes continual use – RESULTS.

Each operations room has a large chart spelling out exactly what he means by RESULTS.

RESULTS

"*R* – *Resist* changing policy and staff once planning has been finalized.
E – *Ensure* co-ordination of all Departments from the planning stage to the completion of projects.
S – *Stop* paper arguments and departmental disagreement.
U – *Use* standard plans and technical capacity correctly.
L – *Land* to be acquired quickly, sites decided without delay.
T – *Team* to tour; a development team to be appointed and tour the country from time to time to deal with delays in development.
S – *Spotlighting* progress from month to month in order to diagnose and remedy delays."

Phases of development

Development must be done by phases. After the first phase was launched and running smoothly the launching of the second, third and fourth phases was directed. No new phase could be launched until it was proved that the previous phase was producing results.

The following are the main phases in the present National Rural Development Plan:

Phase I – Government to shoulder its own responsibilities first

The Government would construct a framework of development, with better roads; more schools; more health clinics; opening up more land; more drainage and irrigation projects; increasing health, veterinary and agricultural extension services; more and better water supplies; more rural industries; better communication and more electric power for industries; more facilities for a better way of life in every rural village.

Phase II – Part to be played by the people

Phase I having been launched, the Government is able to call on the rural people to work harder on their land and their individual tasks towards the raising of their own standard of living. This phase is carried out by a very extensive Adult Education/Civics Programme with a separate directive for its implementation.

Phase III – The setting up of better marketing facilities

Thousand of acres of land, having been opened up in Phase I and cultivated by the people in Phase II, were beginning to produce better crops. In order to ensure that the rural dweller obtains the maximum return for his efforts, action has been taken to set up a National Marketing Authority.

Phase IV – Rectifying the imbalance between the rural and urban economy of the country

The fourth phase is designed to give intensive training in business, commerce and industry to the entrepreneurs of the rural areas, so that they have opportunity to enter into the commerce and industry of the nation if they so wish, of if they remain in the rural areas so that they can improve their own standards.

"Red book" development plans

No country can develop merely by government action. Unless there is active participation in the plan by every citizen, development is bound either to fail, or at best to produce mediocre results.

DIAGRAM NO. 5 RED BOOK PLANS


NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN
STATE DEVELOPMENT PLAN
DISTRICT RED BOOK PLAN
REQUESTS FROM THE PEOPLE
Roads & Bridges
(i) To give access to existing villages
(ii) To open up new land
Land for new development
Water supplies for better health
Marketing facilities for rural produce
Rural industries
Schools in every village
Playing fields for the youth
Irrigation for padi areas

and many, many other types of projects.

In the Deputy Prime Minister's own words:

"The underlying principle behind our development planning and the implementation of our programme is based on a well-known international principle, that no government however good or however efficient it may be, no matter how many hundreds or thousands of officers it may have, no matter how many plans and policies it may have, no government in the world can hope to succeed with a development programme unless it has the full support of the people themselves."

At the pre-planning stage it was foreseen that many of the major projects for the economic development of the country would take a long time to complete, such as large hydro-electric schemes; major drainage and irrigation schemes; hospitals ; major road projects; large schools, and university development. In any developing country, particularly after newly-gained independence, there is an impatience for progress and a great demand for quick and tangible results. In a democracy this demand is particularly vociferous.

It was necessary, therefore, to devise a system of what might be called "a development cover-crop", so that, while action was being taken on long-term projects, short-term projects for the benefit of every village could be implemented immediately, in order that in every village and every town, no matter how far away from the country's capital, there might be some positive proof of development. Development "must not only be done but must be manifestly seen to be done". This was the logic of the "Red Book" system.

The Deputy Prime Minister then issued the following directive on the preparation of the "Red Book" plan :–

See Diagram No. 5 on page 161.

"*Purpose*

A district rural development plan, if carefully thought out and actively implemented, will benefit the livelihood of many thousands of people in the district and contribute considerably to the future prosperity of Malaya; it therefore deserves the very best effort that can be put into its preparation. Careful co-ordinated planning will save time, tempers, energy, and funds when projects are in progress. Time spent in careful planning is well worthwhile.

Departmental differences can be the death of development. Co-ordination and co-operation are the life-blood of all action on development. All departmental officers must play their part and work together as a team.

Main essentials of rural development

There are two main aspects of rural development:

(1) the improvement of existing villages;

(2) the opening up of new areas of land with new villages.

The following are the basic physical essentials of development which need careful planning:

(*a*) roads and bridges;

(i) to give access to existing villages, and

(ii) to open up new areas of land;

(*b*) land development;

(*c*) water supplies;

(*d*) processing and marketing facilities for rural produce;

(*e*) rural industries;

(*f*) schools, health centres and playing fields;
(*g*) irrigation for padi areas;
(*h*) electricity and telecommunications, where possible.

There may be other essentials, for different districts have different needs; these should be included in the District Plan.

Priority

Planning and subsequent action on the Plan takes priority over all other work in the district.

All officers are here charged with the duty of faithfully implementing the detailed instructions which follow for the production of this plan.

Results are what we want!

Action by district rural development committees

Rural development problems and proposals must first be studied on the ground. Mere paper planning from a desk is useless.

1. First collect all outstanding requests from the people, e.g. village roads, bridges, etc.

(*a*) Requests which are not practicable:
reject these and inform village applicant with regret.

(*b*) Requests which are practicable:
retain these for consideration in the Plan.

2. Next collect and consider all proposals by government departments and integrate these with village requests in a single co-ordinated plan.

3. The method of planning is to be as follows:

(*a*) first take stock of what already exists and where;
(*b*) summarize what improvements can be made to what exists;
(*c*) consider where new areas can be opened up and list proposals to achieve this;
(*d*) show location of all proposed improvements and new proposals on tracings.

4. Officers responsible for planning will avoid exchange of correspondence. They will in all cases proceed by personal discussion and joint consultation.

The Book Plan

1. The results of the above co-ordinated action are then to be reduced to graphic form in the series of tracings and summaries listed below:

(*a*) basic district map,
(*b*) land map (future land development proposed),
(*c*) road map (future road development proposed),
(*d*) rural water supplies,
(*e*) minor irrigation works,
(*f*) river clearing proposals,
(*g*) schools, health centres and playing fields,
(*h*) rural processing and marketing facilities,
(*i*) rural industries,
(*j*) co-operative development,
(*k*) telecommunication facilities,
(*l*) rural electricity supplies.

2. Detailed instructions for the preparation of these tracings and summaries are given on each page."

The Red Book system proved to be a tremendous success and can be called the 'umbilical cord' between the people in the villages on the one hand and economic planning and policy-making at top level on the other. It is a continuous process by which each day the expressed needs of the people in the rural areas are fed into the Red Book and implemented while at the same time action on major projects continues.

Results achieved

A review of the present Malayan Development Plan was carried out after 2½ years of implementation and statistics showed that, in many cases targets had not only been achieved but had exceeded expectations. It is not intended to list these achievements but they are visible to any visitor to Malaya, as tangible results on the ground.

The Role of Rural Local Government in an Independent Kenya

by A. St. J. Hannigan

In African countries which have recently obtained their independence from Britain, there is a tendency to try and gather in the reins of control to the centre. This is due largely to the intense desire of the political leaders to develop their countries as quickly as possible. It is a situation where plans for agriculture, roads, land use and industrial and co-operative development jostle and struggle for priority at a national level, and can be contrasted with the days of colonial rule where development was usually within the provincial structure. There was little money available in colonial days and areas were expected to be self supporting, with the result that the amount and speed of development depended largely upon the attitude of the administrative and specialist staff in a given area.

Together with this new ferment of plans and ideas from the centre where there is an almost chaotic impulsion to do everything at once, there stands the structure of rural local government inherited from the British. This system of local government, so far as structure and services are concerned, bears some similarity to that of Britain, where local government is primarily concerned with essential but non-productive services. In Britain, however, local authorities are fighting to retain their existence from behind the entrenchment of tradition whilst in Africa, by contrast, we find in most places that the local authorities are not based on the old tribal tradition but are in themselves of recent origin. Taking Kenya as an example, African district councils somewhat similar to British councils were set up in 1950 and county councils in the European areas even later, in 1952. This structure had hardly time to become established before it was altered by the abolition of the European county councils in 1963, and the setting up of new county councils for the whole country, under the control of the Regions into which Kenya has been divided. It is permissible therefore to wonder if these new councils can survive in the newly independent countries of Africa or, even if they are to survive, will it be merely as dustbins for unremunerative services into which the Central Government can off-load some of its financial burden, or is it the intention that they should be allowed to play a part in the social and economic development of the countries concerned?

It is proposed to take Kenya as an example of these problems, with the structure broadly outlined in the constitutional alterations of 1963 (Constitution of Kenya, Kenya Government Gazette Supplement No. 105, 10th December 1963), which divided governmental power between the Central Government, the Regions and the County Councils. Under the 1963 Constitution, the powers of the new county councils were similar to those of their predecessors and the councils came under the control of the Regions,[1] whilst the Regions took over

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[1] Under new constitutional provisions enacted, they have reverted to Central Government control.

some of the former powers of the Central Government, such as control over secondary education and district hospitals. From a local government point of view however, one of the most interesting features of this new structure has been the provisions which seek to give financial independence to the local authorities. These have stemmed from the suggestion of the Fiscal Commission, one of the commissions set up prior to independence to study the Kenya scene, which submitted its report[2] in January, 1963. The Fiscal Commission stated (para. 69, p. 26): "We have been encouraged to believe that the creators of the new constitution are agreed in desiring a healthy system of local government to which important responsibilities can be delegated". And on page 59, para. 178: "We regard it as a fundamental principle of local government that local authorities should have substantial resources of their own . . . Our proposals have been designed in the belief that the Regional Authorities will wish to make their local authorities as financially independent as possible and will not want to compel them in the early days of independence to limit local services by lack of finance which they could themselves have raised". So far so good. But it is not clear what was the intention of the members of the Fiscal Commission. As we have asked, were they thinking of local authorities with sufficient money to play a part in the development of Kenya, or were they thinking of local government as a receptacle for unwanted services? It is necessary to be clear on this point; otherwise it is not possible to come to any definite conclusion when faced with the questions or statements which are continually raised when local government is considered, such as 'Have councils enough money?' 'Are they run efficiently?' or 'Have they too much to do?'. Stemming from these two alternatives in purpose two further points have to be realized. Firstly there is an obvious need for efficiency in local government; but a council may be run efficiently and still be unprogressive. Secondly, an inefficient council, even if it wants to, cannot play a part in the development of the country.

With these thoughts let us look at the implementation of the proposals of the Fiscal Commission and see how the idea of local financial independence may help efficiency on the one hand, and the development of the country on the other. The Fiscal Commission proposed (p. 108 of the report), that there should be a new form of graduated personal tax, which would be collected by and belong to the local authorities. This would take the place of the old graduated personal tax, which had gone to the Central Government, and the old local poll tax which had been, after government grants, the major source of revenue of the African district councils. The Fiscal Commission gave reasons for these proposals – that it was a means of establishing that major taxes should fall to the principal beneficiaries and also that 'there was a sufficient capacity available within the ambit of the new tax to offer a major contribution to the revenue problems.' A further point considered was the elimination of the central government grants to the local authorities. These consisted primarily of grants for health, education, roads and a tax grant, and amounted to a considerable part of the revenue of local authorities: in 1959, for instance, grant aid from the Central Government covered 52 per cent. of the total expenditure of all African district councils. On these grants the Commission stated (page 20, para. 51): "It is the logical outcome of the new Constitution, and in particular of the changed direction of the dependence of local authorities, that these central government grants should cease". And in the event, under the new

[2] Report of the Fiscal Commission, Govt. of Kenya, 1963, Govt. Printer, Kenya.

proposals all the above grants have been withdrawn with the exception of the road grant.

A look at the operation of these proposals for a particular council may help to clarify the position: the council to be taken being the Masaku County Council, which has been formed from the old Machakos African District Council together with a portion of the former Nairobi County Council. The probable expenditure of the council for 1963 has been given as £338,963, and the estimated expenditure for 1964 as £412,315. This increase is largely due to expenditure on primary education, which rose from £158,711 in 1963 to £213,000 in 1964. Formerly, the Central Government paid to the African district council two-thirds of the recurrent cost of primary education for onward transmission to the District Education Board, the council itself finding the remaining third; now the new county council has to meet the full cost of this service. Under the readjustment therefore, the council loses £104,861 in Education Grant. It also loses £22,400 on the graduated tax grant and £14,763 in health grants, as well as its former general rate of £73,510. Revenue therefore drops by £215,534, which is offset by the new graduated personal tax, estimated to bring in £205,000. It will be seen that the new tax therefore does not even cover the lost revenue, let alone the increase in expenditure. The result is that the deficit will have to be met from some other source, a situation envisaged by the Fiscal Commission, which stated: "It is certain that, at least at the onset, local authorities will have need of quite substantial assistance from the regional authorities." It has in fact been calculated that for all local authorities outside Nairobi the total revenue of £6,001,000 will be offset by an estimated expenditure of £8,313,000, which will leave a deficit of £2,312,000. We can say therefore, broadly speaking, that the independence proposed by the Fiscal Commission has resulted in the local authorities being no longer able to rely on grants from the Central Government. They have more power to collect a larger revenue, and their obligations have increased due to the added burden of primary education. The total services in an area however, have not increased, and the deficit in revenue created by these changes has to be met by grants from the regional authorities.

Financial independence from the Central Government there may be; but can it be said that the new financial structure, and the other changes which have taken place within local administration since the ending of colonial rule, go to the breeding of efficiency or to the enhancing of the role of the local authorities in the scheme of development? If the answer is in the negative, then the pressures for centralization may result in a diminution of the position of local authorities.

We have seen how responsibilities and revenue have increased. We should also mention that in a number of cases the areas of the councils have increased. Where there were formerly seven European county councils and thirty-three African district councils, there are now only thirty-three county councils. Turning from finance let us see how it is proposed to run these enlarged councils. Under the old structure, there ran side by side with the system of local authorities an elaborate structure of central government field administration, with provincial and district teams composed of all the senior government specialist staff in an area, whose task it was to plan and execute development under the chairmanship of the district commissioner, who was also, as often as not, the chairman of the African district council. As to the local councils themselves, the European county councils possessed a number of English-trained European local government officers; whilst for the African areas there was a number of

financial advisers. At one time there were up to thirty local government officers in Kenya with the full training and diploma of the Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, who not only straightened out the financial troubles of the councils, but also gave on-the-job training (U. Hicks, *Development from Below*,[1] pp. 214 and 220). So far as the clerks to the African district councils were concerned things however, were not so fortunate. They were all too often worthy men of clerical grade, who lived under the shadow cast by the effulgence of the district commissioner; persons who had neither the training nor the qualifications to play the role of leader in council affairs when the time came for the disappearance of the district commissioner.

Changing times have not improved the position. On the broader front, local government has had to compete with central government and business firms for the few trained Africans who are available to replace the departing Europeans. The one trained administrator with graduate qualification in every area, the regional agent, has lost a lot of the power formerly held by his predecessor, the district commissioner, and is left primarily with the control over law and order. He is however, a member of the county council. To remedy the lack of local government chief officers, training is being carried on at the Kenya Institute of Administration for clerks to the council in the local government sections of the Corporation of Secretaries examination, but this is an English qualification and to date only three have passed the complete intermediate section. The crucial problem however, is not the lack of clerks to the council, but the lack of treasurers, and here there is a dearth of Africans to take the place of the rapidly departing Europeans. There are thirty-three county councils and seven municipalities, and to date there is only one African with the appropriate professional qualifications, together with four more who have just passed the intermediate Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants examination. This problem, however, is being seriously tackled at the Kenya Institute of Administration, where a second course has just commenced for nineteen students, most of whom will be sitting their examination in November 1965. There are also 22 students preparing for the examination of the Accounts Clerk Certificate of the I.M.T.A., and in January 1965 a further six months special course for treasurers will be started. It will however be sometime before the products of these courses will show a return, and there is an ever-present danger that once trained they will be seduced elsewhere by the offer of higher salaries. We should mention that there is also a lack of trained junior staff, which has meant that the senior officers of councils have to waste much time in doing things which would in normal circumstances be done by their sub-ordinates. Finally when considering the problems of staffing, one should mention that the work of the local government staff is sometimes hindered by the attitude of the elected councillors, many of whom have little experience of the restrictions upon the role of a councillor, and have often been elected on a party ticket rather than on their suitability for the post.

Such factors therefore as lack of staff and the size of councils, together with the great difficulties of communications are telling against the efficient working of the local authorities, and one can see the argument for closer control if not a complete take-over, by the Central Government of the running of all local services. It should be realized on this point that governmental structures are in a state of flux. As we have said, the Central Government has just taken back

[1] Oxford University Press, 35s.

control of local government from the Regions. The audit of local authorities has always remained in the hands of the Central Government, and the approval of the estimates, which for a brief period was under regional control, reverted to the Central Government in the middle of 1963. These are symptoms of the desire for centralization; but let us concentrate on ways of improving the efficiency of local councils for the moment. There is obviously a need for more training at all levels. Other suggestions might be made to improve the position. It might, for instance, be possible to make more use of the regional government agent, who, as we have said, is one of the few highly trained persons in an area. This could be done by making him an executive officer of the council. A further suggestion might be to have a "shock troop" of experts on the lines of the former financial advisers but extended to include experts in other fields, who could launch themselves on a council in trouble. But experience has shown that a council thus resuscitated would probably fall back into difficulties due, amongst other reasons, to the failure to collect the local tax.

This problem of satisfactory tax collection has always been present, and is now more important than ever before. The assessment of the present financial position of local authorities which has been given above is based on the assumption that the local authorities will collect a stipulated amount of graduated personal tax, but tax collection has always been difficult. Poll tax collection was poor in the past; in the Machakos area, for example, out of 108,000 registered tax payers, only 15,000 paid taxes in 1961, and 20,000 in 1960. In the Fort Hall district where there were 80,000 names in the register, only 30,000 paid in 1959, and these two councils were not the exception. Turning to the present, the calculated yield of graduated personal tax has been assessed on the collection for 1962, which was a poor year, to which a percentage has been added. For example, if we take the figure from two of the local authorities in the Rift Valley Region, we find the following – in the Turkana Council area the percentage of adult males paying tax in 1962 was 17 per cent. and the target for 1964 has been fixed as 40 per cent.; whilst in Serikwa, where the actual percentage paying was 44 per cent., the target has been fixed as 65 per cent. There is still however, notwithstanding the low computation of possible collection, a reluctance in certain areas to pay tax. The incidence of collection varies considerably. The average for the period to September 1964, for the whole country excluding the towns, was 58 per cent.; but within the councils themslves the amount collected varied from as high as 100 per cent. in Nyandaria in the Central Region to 20 per cent. in the Mandera Council. This reluctance to pay tax, it is suggested, is due to a weakness in local government which goes deeper than a mere lack of efficiency. The malady which besets local government stems from the emphasis placed upon *non-economic* services, i.e. essential but non-productive services which do not help to develop the natural resources of a local area. If the people feel that the local authority is not helping them in their attempts to improve their way of life, then they will be ever reluctant to help the council.

The emphasis on non-economic services is not a new problem. It has been present since the setting up of the African district councils; in 1959, for example, of the net expenditure of all African district councils, education amounted to 40 per cent. of the whole, health to 17 per cent., administration 15 per cent., roads 11 per cent. and community development 5 per cent., whilst all the other service, combined, which include agriculture, forestry and veterinary services, only accounted for 8 per cent. of the total net expenditure. The accounts of

the individual councils prior to 1964 also reflect this emphasis. In Machakos, for example, out of a total expenditure for 1959 of approximately £235,000, only £9,173 was spent on agriculture, forestry and veterinary services – 3¾ per cent. of the total. At that time also, notwithstanding that government grants accounted for about half the total expenditure, the council was mainly dependent upon cesses[8] and the local poll tax to meet the remainder of its expenditure. The result of this was that if the economy of the area failed, the taxes would not be paid and cesses not collected and the local authority would not be able to pay its way.

This in fact was what happened in Machakos following the three very bad years of 1959, 1960 and 1961, when the crops failed due to drought and floods. The council, although it made drastic economies in 1961 and borrowed all available money from capital revenue and reserves to help finance the general fund, had only £35,000 cash at the beginning of 1962 and needed £72,000 from tax revenue to meet the estimated cost of basic services. It is not suggested that the economic situation in the area was the sole cause of the shortfall in revenue. There was also considerable political agitation which had led people to refuse to pay taxes. It is suggested however that the fact that the African district council was not completely identified with the development of the area was a contributory factor in the revenue deficiency. The immediate need for the ordinary people in the Machakos area after three lean years was to grow and market the produce to feed themselves and give them some money, and to this end the council was not an active participant. If the African district council had been concerned with the marketing of crops and the provision of lorry services, for example, and by so doing had helped people towards achieving their primary aim, the people might have been more ready to help the council.

In taking Machakos it may be felt that too much reliance is being placed on a council with a bad political history, but we find the same emphasis in the past on non-economic services in other councils. In the Samburu Council area, a poor pastoral area for instance, expenditure on agriculture and veterinary services amounted to only 4 per cent. of the total, and in the Fort Hall district, a wealthy agricultural area, out of a total expenditure of £261,627 only £12,453 was spent on veterinary services, agriculture, community development and water supplies. Here it was stated in the detailed estimates for 1961 on agriculture: "This service includes only inspection staff. The District Council regretfully was obliged to refuse the request of the District Agricultural Officer to spend money on tractors and a district show through lack of funds."

On the above figures showing the emphasis on non-economic services, a word of caution should however be given. Some services provided by the councils, such as roads, do of course contribute indirectly to economic development. Also some councils ran money-making concerns such as the ranch run by the council in Machakos which made a profit of £1,000 in 1959. What is suggested is that the activities of the local authorities did not go far enough in associating the councils in the eyes of the ordinary people with the economic development of their area.

Today, with the withdrawal of central government grants, and the almost complete dependence upon the collection of the graduated personal tax, local authorities are even more directly implicated in the economic development of the area in which they are situated than in the past. We find however that there

[8] Local authority levies at a fixed rate per pound on agricultural produce such as groundnuts, sisal, coffee and vegetables.

has been no change in the emphasis in local services. If we look at the new council in the Machakos area, we find that of a total estimated expenditure for 1964 of £412,315, 14 per cent. is allotted to health, 50 per cent. to education, 14 per cent. to administration, 9 per cent. to roads and 2 per cent. for community development. Only 2 per cent. is allotted to the economic services of agriculture, forestry and veterinary services and in respect of these services we find, amongst other things, that coffee nurseries formerly owned by the council have been disposed of, and that whilst expenditure on veterinary services has gone up from £2,905 in 1963 to £6,420 for 1964, the expenditure in both forestry and agricultural services has decreased. To take another example, in the new county council of the Central Rift, which is made up of a former European county council and an African district council, out of an estimated expenditure for 1964 of £767,636 administration accounts for £38,000, education £216,524, health £65,000, roads £178,419, county development £17,398, whilst agriculture and veterinary services only account for £8,111 – about 1 per cent. of the total expenditure.

It would be possible to continue listing similar figures, but they all point to the same thing, the emphasis upon non-economic services, a situation filled with danger so far as councils in developing countries are concerned. It may be possible to meet the revenue deficit, to increase the incidence of tax collected, and to improve the efficiency of councils. But local authorities embedded in an agricultural economy will always be, as we have said, in danger of collapse and a take-over by the central government unless they are fully integrated in the national plan for development. There are signs that the Kenya Government is aware of the problem and proposes to take some steps to remedy the situation, as it has made suggestions in the 1964-1970 Development Plan which will help local authorities to play a part in the country's development. The Report states on page 113, for example, that in order to channel the enthusiasm for self-help in a useful direction, a pyramid of voluntary unpaid community development committees will be established at local, regional and national levels which will incorporate professional departmental officers. These will function under the central, regional, and local authorities, and will have funds at their disposal to assist self-help schemes when required. Another example of the awareness of the position of local government is set out on page 100 of the Report. The Plan refers to the deficit which will have to be met by grants from the regions and continues: "Thus local authorities will be hard-pressed to cover recurrent expenditure and there is little likelihood that substantial capital expenditure can be undertaken from internal resources in the face of such recurrent deficits. In any event, the normal method of financing development of local government has been by loans". The Report then proposes that the Local Government Loans Authority should continue to be used to finance local projects for all matters except housing, which will be handled by the Central Housing Board. In the past however, local authorities, excluding Nairobi, consumed an average of over half a million pounds annually in loans, and as it will be difficult to find sufficient money in the immediate future, it is proposed to allow only £400,000 for loan purposes to the municipalities (excluding Nairobi) and the thirty-three county councils for the year 1964-65, with half a million for the years 1965 to 1969 inclusive, and £550,000 for 1969-70. The Development Plan finally states that the Central Government will ensure that facilities are provided for the training of local government staff.

But is this enough? What of co-operative development? How is this linked

with local government, save through the representation of councillors in their local co-operatives? The same applies to the teeming agricultural boards of every kind. The proliferation of organizations, each with its own staff, in a country which suffers from a lack of trained staff is surely wasteful. Might it not be possible to concentrate the services of the local authorities, the boards and the co-operatives into one body? Call it a county council if you will; but let it be a body which would break away from the British concept of local authorities as organizations to run unremunerative services, where the officers of the council are the servants of the councillors. Change this to a body which would be concerned with all things appertaining to development and government in the area, where the councillors would be in an advisory capacity to the specialist staff as a useful sounding board of local opinion and also to obtain the co-operation of the local people. Where, also, the regional government agent could act as a co-ordinator of the many services and where the specialists could draw, in their turn, on knowledge and experience from their headquarters. With a structure of this kind, it would be possible to pay salaries which would attract staff of a high calibre. By these means it is suggested that efficiency might be enhanced and the other obstacle to a healthy growth of local government, the lack of inclusion in the overall plan for development, be overcome. Other remedies will not achieve this end. To divide up economic services between central and local bodies has never proved satisfactory. There is always confusion as to who is to run what, and the wealthier and more powerful partner, the central government, will always take the lion's share. To base the future of local government on efficiency alone is not satisfactory when set against the central government's desire for development and the attendant attraction towards central control. To allow local government to flourish it should be allowed to take an active part in the overall development of the country.

The Impact of Socio-Economic Factors on the Land Tenure Pattern in Northern Nigeria

by H. A. Luning

Introduction

Over most areas of Africa, south of the Sahara, land and holding of land occupy a central place in the traditional economy. Produce for subsistence was and still is over large areas obtained mainly by the combination of two factors of production: land and human labour – the hoe being the extension of the hand – with the addition of some seed. Quite often the introduction of case crops has brought practically no change in this pattern.[1] The rights of land have been vested in groups, controlled either by kinship, lineage or by chiefs, village headmen and other group representatives. All these groups have claims to land and they defend their particular areas, there usually being no vacant land outside the specific sphere of interest.

Since the early days practically all literature on African land tenure[2] has been produced by anthropologists, administrators and lawyers, and for good reasons. Traditional land rights cannot be described without taking account of the religious, political, social and economic factors. Most of these studies on land tenure have approached the subject from the point of view of the anthropologist. Many studies have borne out such features as the magico-religious attitudes towards the land, the myths about the ancestor to whom the origin of the group and its territorial claim can be traced, the prestige values attached to holding land, theories on inalienability of land, etc. Anthropologists have quite rightly warned us that we should not use European concepts of land tenure, as they so often confuse the argument.[3]

These *ad hoc* studies are most valuable to the student of land tenure, but conditions have not remained unchanged in these societies, which have experienced increasingly closer contacts with the outside world. This is a reason why the subject should also stimulate the interest of the economist, though there still appear several controversies about its significance. For instance, on the allocation of factors of production, Dalton asserts that in our economy factors as well as products are marketable commodities. In tribal Africa, products are frequently marketed but factors almost never. A distinguishing characteristic of such economies is that labour and natural resources have no separate 'economic' organization; they are merely expressions of social obligation, social affiliation, and social right.[4]

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[1] A.F.A.O. Agricultural Economist reports in a Farm Management Survey (1963) carried out in Zaria Province, Northern Nigeria, where much attention is focussed on cash-crops such as cotton and groundnuts, that 95 per cent. of the value of input consisted of labour.

[2] The term "land tenure" is sometimes used in a different sense. We will define it here as the type of right(s) of individuals or groups in land.

[3] For example: M. Gluckman: African Land Tenure; The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, June, 1945; and P. Bohannan: 'Land', 'Tenure' and 'Landtenure'; African Agrarian Systems, D. Biebuyck (ed.) 1963.

[4] G. Dalton, Traditional Production in Primitive African Economies. *Quarterly Journal of Economics, Aug.* 1962.

It is not contended here that Dalton's "primitive African economies", however defined, do not exist but there is also the other side of the coin. Various research workers report, as for instance from the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Buganda and Northern Rhodesia, an increasing individualization and alienation of land.[5] According to White, in Northern Rhodesia: "the conception that Africans do not sell land cannot be sustained" and "African land tenure in Northern Rhodesia can best be defined as individual tenure, the tenure being more explicitly clarified by a statement of the individual rights which exist".[6]

Land tenure studies on Africa, which have been published over the last two decades, show a great variety of aspects and indicate that systems are being modified under rapidly changing conditions. In the following case study on Northern Nigeria a quantitative description of the local pattern is presented. Data are derived from a field survey carried out during the period 1960-62. The economic and social forces which are at work and the degree to which the original land tenure system has evolved under the impact of these forces will be elucidated.

General

The field survey was conducted in the relatively densely populated provinces of Katsina and Sokoto. This predominantly agricultural region enjoys a semi-arid climate with a short rainy season of approximately 4-5 months. During this period food grains (millet, sorghum) and cash crops (groundnuts, cotton) are tended by hoe cultivation. Cultivation of the soil has become permanent over most of the area. Fertility is maintained through application of manure from domestic animals, mostly sheep and goats, and sometimes the nomadic Fulani are invited to kraal their animals on the land. The settled population are predominantly Hausa and are Muslims. The high population density is mainly concentrated in Kano, Katsina and parts of Sokoto and Zaria Provinces and this congestion can be attributed to historical factors such as the existence of the Fulani Empire, the relatively abundant availability of ground water and the fact that sandy soils are easy to till.

The Emirs (mostly Fulani) and the Sultan head the native authority in each area. Power is channelled to district level, from where it percolates down to the village, the smallest administrative unit.

The land laws

The present land laws in Northern Nigeria are laid down in the Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1910, amended in 1916, which declared all native lands to be under the control and subject to the disposition of the Governor and enjoined him to have regard to native laws and customs. Apart from control over land used by aliens, governors have in practice left to native authorities complete control over all land. However, the Ordinance did not grant an absolute proprietary title to the cultivator of the soil, only a right of occupation. According to Elias "the greatest objection to this legislation is its conversion of 'customary ownership' into a mere right of occupation, based largely upon the wrong hypothesis that the Fulani as feudal lords of the people were the real owners of the land – their subjects could be at best only tenants at will".[7] On

[5] Contributions in "African Agrarian Systems", by Köbben, Hill, Baldwin, Richards and White.

[6] C. M. N. White: "A Survey of African Land Tenure in Northern Rhodesia". *J.A.A.*, Oct. 1959 – Jan. 1960.

[7] T. O. Elias: The Nigerian Legal System, Ch. XVIII., 1963.

the other hand, under the Governor's power to make regulations it was provided later in the case of 'native occupiers' that transfer by sale or otherwise of rights of occupancy were made possible, given the consent of the district or village head unless there was some local law or custom to the contrary. Elias mentions that, at the annual conference of Chiefs in 1939, the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Zaria asserted the inalienability of farm lands as a principle of indigenous tenure in their districts and stated that the sale of land was permitted only in certain limited areas and in special cases[8]. Macbride in his 'Land Survey in Kano Emirate' (1937) remarked that alienation by sale was not allowed and the Emir, when hearing of any sale, would order a refund of the purchase money to the payer who was allowed nevertheless to continue in possession.[9]

The indigenous land tenure system

Whatever the legal confusion the traditional pattern of land tenure has been a community control of land.[9] In our survey areas it is the village head who acts as principal land trustee. Land is allocated by him to newcomers who have been accepted to settle in the community and to resident families who require additional land. Under this system the individual has the right to occupy and work the land as a member of the village community and to transfer the land to his heirs. The reversionary right of the community to the land becomes apparent in the case of migration or on the death of an heirless cultivator. Rights in "fallow land" are usually admitted for a specific number of years whereafter the land, if not used, reverts to the common 'village land pool'.[10]

Rules of inheritance are applied according to the Muslim Maliki Code. According to this Code the estate of the deceased is divided amongst those entitled to a share and this arrangement has led to a considerable fragmentation of holdings. Rowling mentions a case in Kano Province, where a field has been divided amongst seven heirs; each of them had obtained five ridges and the new users admitted that they might divide these ridges in turn.[11]

The survey

In 1960 field work was done as part of an agro-economic survey in three village areas in Katsina Province; in 1962 seven localities were studied in Sokoto Province. The differently sized villages can be said to be representative of their particular areas, varying in population density and accessibility, and slightly differing in ecological conditions.

A random sample of thirty to forty informants was taken from each survey area. The family was considered as the sample unit, being a group of people who farm and eat together. This sample represented between 5 and 25 per cent. of the agricultural population. The fields checked were similarly from 5 to 25 per cent. of the total number in fields on the location and were taken from a cross section of the area, near to and far from the village.

It might be considered that in some cases this sample was rather small. The author however found on experience that a small constant-sized sample had advantage over a sample of variable and often larger size. Thirty to forty

[8] T. O. Elias: Nigerian Law and Custom, Ch. VIII, 1963.

[9] As Gluckmann (*op. cit.*) has pointed out, 'communal land tenure' as such in Africa does not exist; a better term would be 'tribal land tenure', viz. the right of every subject to the use of the tribal land.

[10] H. A. Luning: An Agro-Economic Survey in Katsina Province, Northern Nigeria. Ch. IX. 1963.

[11] C. W. Rowling: Report on Land Tenure, Kano Province, Nigeria. 1949.

TABLE I. *Number of fields acquired and fields held under different forms of tenure (percentages per village)*

Locality	Inheritance	Gift	Purchase	Pledge	Loan	Lease	Share cropping	Density of population per sq. mile (approx.)	Acreage of available farmland per head
Western Sokoto									
Tulluwa	51	2	23	—	3	13	8	500	0.5
Katsina Prov.									
Bindawa	48	7	30	5	5	5	—	350	1.0
Kadandani ...	57	4	29	1	8	1	—	250	1.1
Bamle	48	23	11	—	17	1	—	150	1.5
Eastern Sokoto									
Shemori	56	1	25	6	10	2	—	90	1.1
Banga	58	6	11	1	24	—	—	150	1.0
Jangeru	69	2	10	1	15	3	—	130	1.2
Badarawa ...	75	2	6	—	11	6	—	130	1.2
Gatawa	61	2	10	1	24	2	—	100	1.4
Magajin Dawaki	78	6	5	—	9	2	—	100	1.3

informants was just about the maximum number which the average staff member could handle satisfactorily, providing reliable information. Great difficulties were met. For instance the farmers lacked an indigenous unit of area, which meant that all farm land of the informants had to be measured. Again the informants were often suspicious and unwilling to disclose where they were farming; and it took much time, patience and cross-checking in order finally to obtain the required information.

As soon as the area actually cultivated by each family that year had been ascertained, the persons interviewed were asked to give information on the type of rights they enjoyed and under which title their fields[12] has been acquired or were held. Fallow land was also included, but this formed a negligible quantity.

Table I presents the results of this enquiry. "Field" has been taken as unit of measurement, there being only slight differences between the size of the fields held under the various tenure arrangements.

The information was obtained through verbal interviews. Thirty to forty families per village were selected at random according to the recommendations of the Nigerian Federal Department of Statistics. In each family the head of the household (informant) was interviewed four times during the agricultural year. The staff consisted of the author, two or three senior agricultural assistants, and one field assistant per village. All were members of the Government or the Native Authority Agricultural Department.

The author did much of the interviewing and visiting of the farms himself; in other cases, cross-checking in the village provided other means of improving the verbal information.

Fields were measured by pacing. Assistants had been trained how to pace and map fields. To avoid bias as much as possible, a random number of fields per village were also surveyed by a surveyor. This made it possible to discover the pacing error of each assistant.

First, we must *define* the types of acquisition and transaction which have been used in the above table.

Inheritance. In the survey area, upon the death of the head of a family the land is divided amongst the sons. Daughters may also inherit land, usually very small parcels. The sons who take part in the farming may be given parts of their father's field(s) while growing up and often, before his death, a father has already disposed of the estate in such a manner.

Allocation and gift. Whenever land is still available the village head will allocate an abandoned farm or a piece of uncultivated bush on request.

Purchase. Sale, as meant here, is an outright transfer of land for cash. Whenever this transaction takes place two or more witnesses have to be present. It is the only type of transfer for which the village head has to be informed.

Pledge. The right to use the land is passed to another party in exchange for a money loan. The sum paid is normally less than the land's value, no term is stated and the creditor will farm it until his loan is repaid. Here pledging is often a first step prior to sale, especially when the creditor is asked for further loans on the same land.

Loan. When a farmer has more land than he can work or requires he can entrust it to a friend or relative. This 'loan' is made on a year-to-year basis,

[12] The farmholding, defined here as the total land cultivated by a particular family, consists of a number of fields, which are physically separate parcels of land. On the average a family had approximately three fields under cultivation.

and may be marked by a gift in kind, usually some quantity of grain or groundnuts.

Lease. This transaction resembles a loan; it is negotiated for one farming season only, but payment is well-defined and it is always in cash and in advance. The annual rent, which varies according to the fertility and size of the farm, is approximately equal to one-sixth of the expected gross return. In the cases of loan and lease the temporary cultivator does not manure the land, for it might appear that he is establishing a claim on that land.

Share cropping. Share cropping has been encountered in the densely populated locality of Rulluwa. The owner of the land does not provide any seed, tools, etc., to the cultivator, who is entitled to half of the produce.

The demand for land and the land tenure pattern

It is the author's opinion that increasing demand for land has had a decisive impact on the present land tenure pattern in the area studied.

The following factors have largely been responsible in shaping the demand:-

(1) population growth;
(2) introduction of cash crops;
(3) infra-structural developments; and
(4) distance to major markets.

None of these factors can be singled out as having had a singular influence on the demand; a number of them are usually involved. On the basis of Table I, and additional data produced by the surveys, the relative importance of the various determinants can be analyzed as follows.

The foremost determining factor has been the growth of population. This has brought about a condition where, over most of the area studied, all suitable land has been taken up for cultivation.[13] The remaining low orchard bush consists of patches marginal to farming land specifically set aside by the authorities for communal grazing and as fuel reserve.

Table I shows that gifts of land represent only a small part of acquisition. In those instances where a gift had been made this usually dated back 20-40 years ago. In many a case land was presented by the holder to relatives or friends and no actual allotments were made by the village head. The exception is Bamle, situated on the international border, where an influx of population from the Niger Republic had taken place about 30 years ago into a then still sparsely inhabited area.

It was found in some localities that village heads had in fact sold remaining prospective farm land or abandoned farms during the last decade. Similar observations have been made by Oluwasanmi for the southern part of Nigeria.[14]

Population on the land is often unevenly distributed. Grove shows, in the case of Katsina, that pressure is being relieved by local migration as people move down the pressure gradients.[15] According to local law and custom land should be surrendered to the community on departure. In many cases it was found that land had been sold, prior to migration, to relatives and also to non-relatives. To avoid the appearance of selling land the farmer had pledged the land for an amount approximating to the sale price and then absconded.

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[13] Usually between 50-60 per cent. of the surface area.

[14] H. A. Oluwasanmi: Land Tenure and Agricultural Improvement in Tropical Africa. *Journal of Farm Economics*. Aug. 1957.

[15] A. T. Grove: Land and Population in Katsina Province, Northern Nigeria. 1957.

Table I indicates to a certain extent, a relationship between density of population and the occurrence of sales but it does not explain all differences throughout the whole range of columns. In some ways, acreage of farm land available per head of population should be a more reliable yard-stick. The lowest acreage per head is to be found in Tulluwa (0.5 ac.), followed by Bindawa, Kadandani, Banga and Shemori, which are in the order of 1.0-1.1 acre/head. The remaining villages present figures between 1.2 to 1.5 acres/head.

It is this low land/man ratio in Tulluwa which is the principal agent in moulding the land tenure pattern in that area. It is reflected in a considerable occurrence of sales, and the predominance of lease over loan, which indicate a more business type transaction. A further development such as share cropping,[16] has not been encountered in any other village but Tulluwa, and it is certainly no mere coincidence that other cases of share cropping have been reported only from similarly heavily populated areas in Kano.[16]

In the past female relatives normally obtained a share in the chattels. The scarcity of land and the possibilities of obtaining some pocket money from a crop of groundnuts has stimulated women to demand land. Since land can be sold easily and as prices of land move upwards (see below) land is considered more attractive than mere goods.

According to Baldwin, there is evidence to suggest that the present acreage per male adult cultivator is higher than it used to be in Northern Nigeria.[17] A plausible explanation is that the development of the road system has had a profound impact on the demand for land. As is noted in a report, issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, Northern Nigeria (1957):

> "Examination of reports in files shows that there was a startling change in the movement of foodstuffs about 1950-51 when the first effect of the post-war building of feeder roads began to be felt. After 1950-51, the opening of new roads suitable for lorry traffic enabled foodstuffs to be moved more quickly and easily and in far greater quantities and over far longer distances than had been formerly possible by donkey or by simple head-loading. This change also resulted in higher prices being offered to producers in the more remote areas so that it became worthwhile to produce surpluses for export from their home areas."[18]

A similar trend can also clearly be noted in the expansion of cash crop production after 1950-51.

Main markets for the collection of cash crops lie south of the survey villages with the exception of Shemori. Due to the costs of transport there are price differentials which might affect the cropping pattern. In fact, comparison of the cropping pattern in the Eastern Sokoto and Katsina villages from north to south shows an increasing preponderence of cash crop as compared with food crop cultivation. This can at least be partly attributed to price differentials. The greater accessibility to markets from Shemori, Kadandani and Bindawa appear to be related to a greater occurrence in sale transactions of land. Villages off the beaten track have a far greater incidence of such customary transactions as inheritance and loan, as for instance in Bamle, Banga and Gatawa. Nearness to markets and subsequently easier accessibility to capital may be reasons for a greater incidence of pledging (Shemori and Bindawa).

[16] Though land is not evenly distributed amongst families, it should be noted that there is no question (yet) of a landlord-tenant coming into being in the area studied.

[17] K. D. S. Baldwin: Land Tenure Problems in Relation to Agricultural Development in the Northern Region of Nigeria, in "African Agrarian Systems", (*op cit.*).

[18] Movement of Local Foodstuffs. Ministry of Agriculture, Northern Nigeria. 1957.

Price is usually a good measure of the intensity of demand for farm land, but of course there are variations in land prices within one area which can be attributed to fertility differences, distances to the village and the size of farms.

In Table II, figures are presented concerning sales of land. Prices are given as average prices of farm land per acre per village; sometimes comparable villages have been combined to give a larger and more balanced sample.

TABLE II. *Average purchase price in shillings per acre since* 1930 *in various localities*

Locality	1930-40	1941-45	1946-50	1951-56	1956-60
Western Sokoto					
Tulluwa	27		116		180
Katsina Prov.					
Bindawa	5	11	30	56	114
Kadandani	4	11	26	41	95
Bamle	—	4	8	10	15
Eastern Sokoto					
Shemori-Banga ...	—	31		62	
Badarawa-Jangeru ...	—	11		42	
Gatawa-Magajin Dawaki	—	6		21	

Although figures are not always comparable, it is evident from Table II that:

(*a*) the factors which determine the demand for land have had a major effect on its price; density of population (Tulluwa, Bindawa, Kadandani in descending order), the cash crop economy and *related features* like the opening up of new roads and the distance of markets (note for example the difference between villages north and south in Eastern Sokoto and the inaccessibility of Bamle village);

(*b*) prices of land have gone up rapidly. This is partly due to rises in food prices, but a close scrutiny bears out that besides this inflationary trend, the increased demand for land has been the most decisive factor;

(*c*) buying and selling of land has been taking place in most areas for at least thirty years.

Another concomitant phenomena is the fragmentation of farms and holdings. In Tulluwa, the average size of an upland farm is only 0.7 acres and the median farm has a size of 0.5 acres. Sale transactions in Tulluwa, Bindawa and Kadandani, however, indicate that sub-divisions are now becoming balanced by mergers, and farmers exchange pieces in order to obtain contiguous plots. On dividing an estate the dangers of fragmentation are often recognized. In some cases it has been observed that the elder sons bought the land from the father before he died; the other brothers were compensated and these are the people who, unless they can lease or borrow land locally, leave the village seeking farms elsewhere or alternatively turn to the urban areas. The latter feature is still rather uncommon in Northern Nigeria.

The need for changes

The pattern described above should not be taken as being representative of Northern Nigeria as a whole. It is only in those regions where demand for land approximately balances or exceeds supply that the pattern holds true. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that the pattern under discussion is *not* confined to areas surrounding the large towns. With the exception of Tulluwa, close to Sokoto town, all survey points are situated in rural surroundings. It is estimated that the rural population living in an area with the common features described above is between five and ten million people, or one to two million farming families. Little is known about the land tenure of the other parts of Northern Nigeria. Demographic features vary widely throughout the country, but what their influence is on the land tenure pattern cannot be predicted. Rapid changes in conditions, as already described, may also have a profound impact here on indigenous systems.

Case studies of land tenure patterns and the analysis of their underlying forces in Africa have been few and far between. The present detailed study suggests that generalization should be avoided. But, as societies are gradually drawn into the market economy and factors of production are becoming marketable commodities, there is a definite scope for the agricultural economist to come to the aid of the social anthropologist. A parallel could be drawn here to some extent with the case of the "backward sloping" supply curve of labour.[19] Some social scientists have noted that amongst people in under-developed countries wage increases have led to a decreased output of work and this phenomenon was explained by and attributed to the social framework. Whatever truth there might have been in the existence of these labour supply functions in the past, there is abundant evidence that in contemporary Africa this is no longer the case.[20] Like all comparisons however, this one does not hold good entirely; there are still many areas in Africa where land is abundant and tribal tradition and custom powerful; in many instances the influence of the subsistence economy is great and effective demand for agricultural produce is not keenly felt, consequently land has not yet been recognized as a factor of production.

In our study we have found land to be a scarce asset. The traditional concept of communal or tribal tenure, to repeat, is no longer fully valid as is shown in our study-areas by the cases of the village head and the migrant selling the land. The great demand for land has led to an increase in such transactions as lease, sale and share cropping. On one hand, the cultivator realises that the land belongs to the Chief and, on the other, he acts as if there existed a free-hold concept of land.

It should be considered fundamental to any progress in agriculture that the cultivator has an undisputed right of occupancy of land. It is doubtful whether the present legislation could effectively cope with the changed and still fast changing situation in Northern Nigeria.

It is not the purpose of this descriptive article to make any recommendations, but by raising some questions, we may at least elucidate the position of the government authorities who find themselves at the cross-roads as far as land policy is concerned.

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[19] For a fuller explanation of this phenomenon see E. J. Berg; "Backward-Sloping Labour Supply Functions in Dual Economics – The African Case." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. Aug. 1961.

[20] Berg. *Op. cit.*

Should legislation be adapted to the new conditions and to what extent should present practices be allowed to continue? Would it be right to recommend that an annual land tax or rent be substituted for the present head tax? This will become workable only when each land holder is given title to land. It would require land registration in a region which has no indigenous unit of area. Besides there is a great lack of manpower and financial resources to implement such a programme. Should mortgage be allowed officially and should co-operative societies be encouraged to issue credit on the basis of the available farm land? Should leasehold or freehold be given? What about areas where fragmentation has made it difficult to introduce new farming techniques, such as plough farming and mechanization? Should the government take the lead in population re-distribution?

All these problems are inter-related. It raises the question how the government goes about attaining its goal in increasing *per capita* income as set in the development of the industrial against the agricultural sector.

For a nation poor in capital resources, land represents a very important natural endowment. In Northern Nigeria there are still places where farm land is easily available to the cultivators but it is increasingly found that events are catching up with them.

Continuity and Change in Zambian Administration

by HELMUTH HEISLER

"There are in my estimation two vital principles which characterize the growth of a wise administration – they are Decentralization and Continuity".—LUGARD.

Local administration – 1964

By October 1964, when Northern Rhodesia became the sovereign Republic of Zambia the policy of the new government with regard to local administration had begun to emerge. In organizational terms, two decisions are important. The Ministry of Local Government which had since its inception been responsible only for local government in the urban areas, as late as January 1964, assumed responsibility for rural local government. The second event was the inauguration of Provincial and District Government in September 1964, whereby Provincial and District Commissioners were replaced by Resident and District Secretaries. Two further changes disturbed the continuity between the new local administration and the old; firstly, as the name secretary suggests, they became more directly subject to political control, namely that of Under-Ministers; secondly, in order to enable the re-vamped provincial administration to seek a new role and identify itself with socio-economic development, the Ministry of Justice and a corps of magistrates was to assume the judicial functions of the erstwhile district officers whilst the Zambia Police Force was increasingly to take sole responsibility for normal measures to maintain order.

Within the local government system provision is being made for different kinds of local authorities: rural district councils; suburban local authorities; township management boards; city and municipal councils. All local authorities will become responsible to an electorate, although the elections may be informal in some of the smaller communities. In addition, the Minister of Local Government will continue to nominate some members of the rural councils to ensure an easy passage from the native authority to the local government system. While recognizing that the vitality of local government is dependent on the exercise of substantial authority, the Minister will devolve to them such authority only when they provide evidence of their capability to discharge new functions. A vital adjunct to this is the disposal of local revenues raised by local authorities themselves – a system of direct taxation to replace the poll-tax is being tried. A Local Government Service Commission has been established to help stabilize a threatened exodus of expatriates from the urban local government system and to devise equitable conditions of service. In all this, it is the avowed policy of the Ministry of Local Government to guide but not direct local authorities and it is the long-term wish that the standards of rural local government should be raised to the excellent position of urban local government.

The major task of the Provincial and District Government will be to co-ordinate the work of the technical ministries and departments under the general guidance of Under-Ministers. Each province, henceforth, is led by a politician called an Under-Minister who is directly responsible for his conduct and the affairs of his ward to the President. President Kaunda has emphasized that the implementation of government policy is normally the responsibility of the civil

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service and he has categorically charged his Under-Ministers not to involve themselves in the administration of the civil service. They are to perform their duties in three ways: by chairmanship of the Provincial Development Committees and Provincial Information Committees (which will submit monthly reports relating to the welfare and security situation in the provinces); consultation with pressure groups such as political parties and trade unions; extensive touring and contact with workers and citizens at the grass-root level. Under-Ministers will not be entrusted with statutory powers. Resident secretaries will be directly responsible to Under-Ministers for the activities of the civil servants under their charge and both they and the district secretaries will furnish them with every possible kind of assistance.

The significance of urban development

Retrospectively considered, the development of the rural local government system has been extraordinarily slow to materialize since the directive of the Secretary of State for the Colonies issued seventeen years before Zambian independence. As recently as 1959 a committee of officials reported to the Monckton Commission that the 'policy of the government in recent years has been to strengthen the native authority councils and, as they develop and improve in efficiency, to entrust to them an increasing share of local responsibility'. This was reiterated in the African Affairs Annual Report of 1962. How is this to be explained? A number of closely interwoven factors may be recounted. Why was it that, of the three dimensions of indirect rule, native authorities and native courts were only introduced in 1929, and not until 1936 was the system finally completed – on the Tanganyikan model – by the setting up of native treasuries. Fundamentally this reflected the doubts of the government as to the ability and authority of the chiefs. To make more certain of their ability to discharge their duties it was proposed, in 1939, that certain councillors who were representative of 'more progressive elements' should be appointed, but the onset of war interrupted this. In 1948 the government provided for the establishment of a native authority bureaucracy by permitting the inclusion in native authority councils of a few paid officials. The new post-war policy of partnership, the nature of the Ten Year Development Plan launched in 1947, tribal heterogeneity, the post-war growth of national politics, and the dearth of rural talent pinpoint the weaknesses of indigenous bureaucracies and the failure to switch on to a democratic local government system until 1964. Briefly, the explanation is that until political expediency made this imperative, there was no alternative to the native authority system.

In social terms, this was due to the perception of needs and tasks by government administrators and nationalist politicians. Government officials were concerned to finance the 1947 Development Plan. They were keenly aware of the great wealth of the Copperbelt which led to the position that by 1946, 55½ per cent. of the domestic output of the money economy came from minerals. They were aware that the many external economies which could increase this depended on the growth of the enclave economy which was closely confined to the line of rail. Transport and communications, secondary manufactures, and especially commercial farming to feed the townsfolk, were to officials the first objectives of development. Rural local government as a tool for economic development was seen to have greater significance in the rural areas of countries such as Uganda and Nigeria where the greatest potentiality for growth lay in cash-cropping. It is ironical that in 1947 the Colonial Office decided to demo-

cratize rural administration and replace the emphasis on social development by stress on economic development, with the result that these policies were found incompatible in Northern Rhodesia and democracy was, therefore, temporarily sacrificed.

The early distrust by officials of the capacity of local authorities in the rural areas to develop unaided through democratic processes, persisted. The 73 tribes, among a present population of only four million people, mainly sharing social and cultural identities rather than revealing a socio-political focus, constantly reminded government that some form of domestic political awareness had to be evoked among the tribes before the strains of democracy could be hazarded. Further, they wondered about the quality of rural indigenous leadership due to the townward migration and the late inauguration of African secondary education. The 1964 Hadow Report on the Northern Rhodesia Public and Teaching Services revealed that in October the previous year there were only 39 Africans among a total of 1,298 officers in Division I of the Public Services – and this had a more profound root than discrimination. The officials were most concerned to make the new policy of racial partnership work and the 1951 'Comparative Survey of Native Policy' in Central Africa made it clear that the 'policy in the Northern territories was that in order to fit the African to take his place in the community as a full partner . . . he must be induced to play a full part in politics and administration'. At the same time the African must be prevented from 'involving himself in disaster' as would perhaps occur in the rural areas. But it was evident that with a concentration of Europeans and their norms in the urban areas there was less need to protect the Africans in these places.

As for African opinion, rural local authorities – carefully supervised by district officers and dealing with somewhat mundane matters – were less attractive than the opportunities created for them by government in the urban areas. Examples of these were the regional councils (called African provincial councils from 1944 onwards) which advised senior administrative officials and representatives of African interests in the Legislative Council; the African urban advisory councils established in 1947, which in time included elected members, and acted as electoral colleges for the provincial councils and as sounding boards for African opinion concerning urban developements ; the African housing boards which replaced these councils in importance, and which in turn lost their attraction through the provision of direct representation under the 1959 constitution. From this date onwards the possibility of dominating the whole nation gripped the African imagination and dwarfed the needs of the rural local authority system. But there was one factor which, above all else, united African opinion: hostility towards the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Abetted by the African Mineworkers Union, the African National Congress, which was displaced by the splinter United National Independence Party after 1959, was relentless in its single-minded concentration on the destruction of the federal fabric and its concept of partnership – whereby the complementary function of Europeans and Africans were admitted alongside the belief that for many years to come the European rider must stay in the saddle of the African horse. The result of all this was not certain until late 1963 when the Federation was dissolved. It is small wonder that the quest for power and the destruction of the federal enemy, combined with a general shortage of natural and educated leaders, lead African opinion to overlook rural problems except in so far as their aggravation might win rural votes.

Achievements of the native authority system

The native authority system had negative merit in that there was no really practicable alternative. It did, however, have some positive value which can be gauged from the consideration of the question: what significance does the belated development of local government have for the future? The answer to this will largely depend on the degree to which problems common to any system of grass-roots government were resolved during the existence of the native authority system. The common problems of grass-roots government will be discussed under the general headings of size and areas, local leadership and legitimacy.

The search for optimum areas for native authority units received a new impetus after the war. Originally there was an attempt to make each tribe, or a clearly defined and homogeneous segment if the tribe was large, a native authority. Nevertheless, diversity in size has persisted and in 1959 it was reported that the population in the area of a superior native authority might range from 15,000 to 300,000 people. Both centralizing and de-centralizing tendencies were, and are still, at work in this task. The recognized objects of the optimum area seem to be: (1) to deploy scarce native authority administrative staff most efficiently; (2) to minimize the wage burden on local authority treasuries; (3) to create optimum administrative units for the technical services of the central government; (4) to effect some kind of pool of resources which inevitably are of varying quality so that, say, the low-taxable capacity of some areas is offset by more prosperous areas and the 'conservatism' of some areas is offset by the 'progressiveness' of others; (5) to secure optimum representation for communication and decision-making, and not least (6) to create politically alive communities whose interests transcend tribal boundaries.

The economic viability of local authority areas became a matter of paramount importance when the Cartmel-Robinson Commission's report was accepted in 1949. The report emphasized the importance of local finance for development and essential services, with the corollary that local programmes must be geared to the resources local authorities can create themselves. It thereafter became a guiding principle that the central government should grant aid only in exceptional circumstances. The continued rural exodus often – except in odd instances such as with the Mambwe tribe – was accompanied by a decline in the operational effectiveness of indigenous economies and thereby aggravated the problem. Added to this, the rising aspirations of common people have severely strained local authority ability to produce suffiicent results to maintain the loyalty of rural people and the conditions which are prerequisites for any new momentum for progress.

Generally, the emphasis from 1947 onwards was towards the centralization and enlargement of the size of local authorities. In no way does this imply that the mainly pre-war policy of fitting the area to the tribe was wrong. For instance, the comments of the Provincial Commissioner for the Central Province in 1950 warned that as 'against the axiomatic advantages of creating a large and financially wealthier unit of local government, there remains the danger that, if so widely scattered a society were politically united on foundations of sentiment alone, the authority might be amorphous, and too feeble to curb the play of secessionist tendencies which would probably arise amongst those dissatisfied with whatever paramount chieftain might be appointed'. Without a doubt some common loyalty on a tribal basis had to be first created among the many egalitarian societies of the country. Thus the first stage of the native

authority system was directed towards the vitalization primarily of the institutions of traditional leadership and the second, to be discussed later, was concerned with the legitimization of this in the eyes of common villagers. The Central and Southern Provinces, in particular shared a problem well known in East Africa; the search for, and selection of chiefs among small-scale societies where customary leadership was generally devoid of political content. The converse was the case in the Northern Province, Barotseland and to some degree in the Eastern Province. Here there was authoritarian tribes with centralized political systems and relatively large populations. Their peculiar problem was to ensure that the remoteness between leadership and followers was mitigated by decentralization.

The Secretary for Native Affairs in 1947 compared the pre-war native authority system and local administration with what he anticipated would develop in the future. He recalled that before the war the local administration was led by district commissioners and embryo native authorities. The leadership of the provincial administration, by contrast, he foresaw would be shared more and more by native authorities and the technical experts of the central government. The solo leadership of the provincial administration would be replaced by teamwork. The means whereby Africans could participate more fully in their own local government was outlined in the following year. Provision was made for the election of tribal councillors and the appointment or election of departmental councillors, with the hope that in time traditional councillors would be replaced largely by these new categories of leaders. The position of the chiefs remained carefully safeguarded but one provincial commissioner in 1948 detected a significant change: the chiefs are 'to act in their areas as agents of the authority rather than as self-contained units or subordinate authorities'. This was an important step towards responsible government.

Nevertheless, the district commissioner remained the lynchpin of local administration. However, by 1950 it was felt that those who continued to act as chairmen of the councils should withdraw in favour of Africans because, as one district commissioner put it, 'councils no longer devote themselves to summing up a *rechauffe* of old grievances but in however elementary a manner concern themselves with the "bread-and-butter" politics of routine administration. Their acquaintance with the technique of democratic government, though by no means complete, is developing'. About the same time district officers became very concerned with chivvying and guiding the departmental councillors. These were full time employees of the councils responsible for the operation of certain local services. Training by the local government schools at Chalimbana and Katete, begun in the early '50s, also helped to improve their efficiency, although complaints concerning their integrity and quality have persisted to the present. Low wages led to peculation and the townward movement of many of these persons but there were many attempts to remedy this. Pay rises – sometimes arrived at by sacking inefficient councillors and then spreading the wages vote over fewer persons – did something to arrest the drift, but it does not seem that their remuneration was ever equal to that of African civil servants doing comparable jobs alongside them in the rural areas. The paternal instincts of district commissioners were sometimes evoked due to anxiety that some departmental councillors who were selected by election were not those whom they thought most suitable. Despite much frustration the local administration recorded steady but slow improvement in the conduct of indigenous bureaucrats throughout the 1950's – especially when they came to

accept the district commissioner norms and began to tour!

The troubles which arose from African hostility towards the Federation unfortunately made the attitude of the provincial administration towards the native authority system and support of 'legitimate' authority rigid. As early as 1951-52 dislike of the federal idea was manifest in some rural areas and led to some corrosion of respect for any white government and even its welfare programmes. This found sympathy among some chiefs whilst the traditional chieftains in general held aloof. Law and order maintenance became a growing problem and from 1955 serious efforts had to be made by the provincial administration to enhance the prestige of loyal chiefs who acted as its agents. To some degree the symbol of the agent of welfare was displaced by that of the policeman and gained in importance until Zambian independence. Thus, an element of direct rule was re-asserted as a consequence of the Northern Rhodesia Government's accepting, however reluctantly, the legitimacy of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

One aspect of legitimacy was the search for traditional rulers. Among the authoritarian societies this does not seem to have been a considerable problem but among the egalitarian Soli or Tonga tribes, for instance, the ascription of political chief had little sanction in the social structure. As a provincial commissioner observed in 1951, they 'have great difficulty in visualizing a civil authority which is not associated with magistracy and the priesthood'. To this was added the further difficulty that these people were often cash-croppers and relatively prosperous, and one district commissioner complained that this made them, in their own eyes, somewhat independent of development programmes centred on the local authorities. Hence it is not surprising that these egalitarian tribes took far more readily to achievement-orientated democratic concessions in the late '50s than did, say, the Bemba. The present signs are that cash-cropping, egalitarian social structure, and democracy when combined produce the most vigorous and progressive communities. Democracy and free elections seem to be the long-term solution to the search for legitimate authority among segmentary societies.

Another form of legitimacy concerns development programmes and the alterations in social relations which resulted from them. Political apathy was at first stirred by ensuring the adequate functioning of native authorities and this now appears to have been an important precondition for further change. What made further development possible, however, was the post-war development programme which led to the construction of native authority centres which the Provincial Commissioner of the Central Province believed changed the mind of the common peasant into thinking that the native authority 'is no longer a nebulous institution but a political reality with which his work-a-day life is intimately connected'. Involvement in the development programmes and ability to actually see their results did much to convert the caution and suspicion of villagers. To this end, especially in the Northern Province, the geographical isolation of villagers from native authority centres had to be broken down by de-centralization, as the important re-organization of the Bemba Superior Native Authority in 1961 witnessed.

There may be some long-term advantages to the slow evolutionary changes just described. Modernization requires more than machinery and extension-teams, for it is a process which demands profound structural changes in the organization of economic and social life. In this preliminary stage of modernization political and social stability seems to be important to preserve some integrat-

ing mechanisms before new ones are forged. Two of these mechanisms seem to be of special significance: the family and the system of social stratification.[1] Both are important in creating facilities for new modernizing elites which remain part, and are seen as such by their fellows, of traditional society. Zambia may be fortunate in having so many tribes in which egalitarian ideals are shared and which permit the development of the adaptive skills of family members. Authoritarian family structure may be inimical to such changes. Less information is available about stratification and status systems, but there are signs that these are more flexible in egalitarian societies than those are mere flexible in egalitarian societies than those marked by a high degree of centralized authority. In the former, new elites can be accorded an established place within the structure of rural groups as they do not so obviously challenge the leadership of older elites – in fact their roles may be complementary and not competitive in rural leadership. The egalitarian tribes of Zambia now appear to display a relatively higher degree of solidarity, by contrast with their counterparts, although they have shown greater adaptive attitudes in the process of rural modernization. On the assumption that people follow most readily those whom they can recognize and readily identify themselves with, this augers well for the future.

The native authority system between 1947 and 1964 was not an ideal type but was a transitional form of local administration which seems to make the task of democratic local government in the future in some ways easier. The search for optimum areas of administration, shifts in the meaning and nature of traditional leadership, the foundation of an indigenous bureaucracy for rural local government, in fact the general quest for efficiency stands to the credit of this experience. Added to this is the paramount importance of beginning the task of welding 73 tribes into a political whole. Aspects of direct rule and distrust of democracy were forced upon the provincial administration not by their own inclinations, which were often to the contrary, but by Federal opposition and the comparative recent drive towards autonomy at the national level which meant that until the power struggles of national politics were resolved the status quo had to be maintained in the provinces. The inability of traditional local authorities to cope with demand for rapid modernization can hardly be laid at their door. While the central government development programme largely ignored them in favour of the enclave economy it is remarkable that so much was painfully achieved.

Self-sustained growth

Now we must ask what contribution can be made by local authorities to the future development of Zambia and of course the answer to this turns on the needs of the government and people and the perception by the government of the available mobilisation facilities. This can be put in terms more concrete by distinguishing four factors which will be of especial import to the future of the local authorities.

Firstly from 1959 onwards, when political parties were first compelled to address themselves to the rural electorate, the expectations of the majority of villagers were aroused and they look for changes which will better their levels of living. The path to modernization resulting in self-sustained growth is the only long-term solution to this in a democracy such as Zambia. Secondly,

[1] S. N. Eisenstadt, "Essays on Sociological Aspects of Economic and Social Development", pp. 80, Mouton & Co., 1961.

agriculture is the occupation which affects the majority of the people, and its new recognition as the most important sector for development raises once more the question of the rural agencies and organization through which development is to be channelled. Thirdly, at the same time as political parties had to become national, as well as nationalistic, they began the task of establishing party bureaucracies coterminous with the geographical. extent of the nation. This created an area of leadership for many persons not of the calibre of the national politicians, alternative to the local authority system. As the local representatives of the ruling party these political bureaucrats have become a significant factor in development. Lastly, there is a line of continuity between the past and the present in the intention to continue to devolve power from the capital to the provincial and district government. What is significant is that this is not under the democratic control of the local authorities and is only indirectly controlled from the capital in practice, though it is within the province of each member of the Legislative Assembly to challenge its operation.

The need to modernize, devolution, local indigenous leadership and the new importance of agriculture when considered together are seen to pose certain problems for administration and organization in the future. Simply put, the most vital problem is that dramatic improvements are demanded and the only organization available to do anything about it is one that was created for quite another purpose, for both the new local authorities and the provincial and district government show all the marks of their ancestry. The question is whether these two organizations are suitable to carry a large burden of the expansion of government functions envisaged. The magnitude of the problem can perhaps be judged from looking at these factors once more:–

(1) In seeking for the electoral support of the villagers UNIP[2] entered into some kind of a political contract with them. If they are not to become restive some immediate token of the government's concern must be given in more than words, otherwise the law and order duties of the government may grow to the detriment of progress.

(2) Zambian agriculture in the past has been marked by a concern with those peasants who have shown the greatest response to the precepts of extension workers by becoming cash-croppers. They are to be found mainly alongside the line of rail in the Central and Southern Provinces and adjacent to the Great East Road from Katete to Fort Jameson in the Eastern Province. Barotseland, the North-Western, Luapula and Northern Provinces have been relatively neglected. In order to make the country self sufficient in food supplies there is the constant temptation, with growing problems of staffing extension servicew, to continue this trend and ignore the villagers whose problems due to geographical and social factors are greatest. Concurrent with these difficulties is the high rate of urbanization of Zambia where one-quarter of the people are resident within the geographical extent of the money economy (commercial farming and urban areas). Socially this means a resistance by educated Africans to employment in the rural areas and maybe some new sense of social distance between them and their rural kin.

(3) One of the tasks of the Under-Ministers will be to impose some form of discipline on the local party bureaucracies which have a habit of committing the government in directions in which it does not wish to travel. Their

[2] The United National Independence Party, the ruling political party in Zambia.

opportunity for leadership and self-expression will therefore seek other media, but the limited responsibilities of the present local authorities may not appeal to them for long. It is important that this resouce should not be stifled, however, for although government can create facilities for revolutionary changes it remains for the people themselves to take advantage of these if self-sustained progress is to be realised. Clearly, all sources of indigenous leadership will be essential for this task.

(4) There are several weaknesses in the present administrative structure of the country from the point of view of mounting development programmes. First, it is heavily centralized, and congestion of decision-making in the capital is inevitable. Second, there is inadequate provision for the involvement of people in the preparation of planning at the provincial level because of the one-tier local authority structure. Third, there are signs of increasing reliance on a gigantic development plan which will originate from the Ministry of Finance and is taking almost two years to prepare. In the meantime casual *ad hoc* projects to indicate general goodwill only are under way, and no systematic efforts to accumulate local information, now that the Kafue Basin Survey[3] has been completed, are in progress. The plan will take a long time to be built and launched, there is no problem orientated planning authority, so that departmental bids for influence may remain prominent, and no appreciation nor means yet exist whereby a follow-up of the plans can be made.

It becomes evident from any comparative study of planning that the region is the crucial planning unit. A region must have two characteristics: a sense of unity that derives from the sharing of a language or culture and a common trade network; and, administratively, sufficient population, though not necessarily resources, to justify the employment of a full range of field administrative, economic and social services personnel as an independent command, subordinate only to authority located in the national capital. Its advantages are several. Each region can prepare its own plan with much greater speed than can the central government, which has the task of sorting out the differing requirements of all areas and determining its own resources. Each region in underdeveloped countries need place less reliance on logistics and quantitative estimates than do central planning machineries which constantly complain about the general absence of all kinds of relevant data. The subjective appraisal of regional resources, inhibitions and requirements has much greater validity at this level than that at the national. Greater citizenship involvement can also be arranged at this level. It has become increasingly evident that political representation at the national level is an adequate form of client-system involvement in the planning process and no substitute for the direct participation of local elite. This helps make the plan more easily part of people's wishes and means that their system of priorities is more likely to be accepted with the benefit of increased efficiency. There are too many instances where the first priority of a plan is that of a planner rather than of the beneficiaries, with the result that the former tend to become more and more responsible for this whilst the people themselves continue to seek means to realize their own goals. In general, greater flexibility is achieved by this.

Ideally, decentralization of authority rather than devolution of power is required to maximize the advantages of regional planning. At the moment no

[3] A survey, sponsored jointly by the U.N./F.A.O. and the Zambia Government, of the basin of the Kafue River.

provision is made for this in Zambia. Two alternative structures for this kind of planning esist. There can be a co-ordinated planning team composed mainly of administratiors and technologists. This is suitable for the 'Rural Area Development' being undertaken in Liberia, for instance. Here there is little alternative due to the very limited experience of local government in the interior compared to Zambia. It also seems more suitable for the French-speaking countries of Africa with centralist traditions of administration and concern with uniformity in development. An alternative in English-speaking countries like Zambia is to develop local authorities one stage further, to integrated multi-purpose local authorities such as are known in the U.A.R. and the Indian sub-continent. This fits in with their experience of self-determination within broad limits and the tradition of recognising the cultural diversity of indigenous peoples by not deliberately undermining their separate cultural heritages, unless they have some particularly repugnant expressions such as witchcraft, by measures that seek to impose uniformity in public affairs between peoples with diverse cultures. Such micro-level planning can, however, in time be connected with the macro-plans of the central government and thus can become part of long-term planning, as the experience of Madagascar illustrates. Its advantage in Zambia would be primarily its speed in getting under way and enlisting the full co-operation of rural people.

This would give expression to the democratic desire of Creech Jones in 1947 to employ local authorities as vehicles for economic development. Were this to be recognized by the reform of the administration the continuity in development would lie in the increasing responsibilities of the local authorities.

There are other advantages in a comprehensive and integrated local government system. Firstly, the field-workers of the technical ministries and the provincial and district government would no longer overshadow the nascent local government system in prestige and importance. Secondly, each unit of such a system would presumably have to include resources equal to the largest and most prosperous units achieved under the present system. It is therefore of such a size that it could compete with the central government in offering careers and suitable conditions of service and hence provide truly virile and professional leadership. Thirdly, the need for some co-ordinating activities would fall away as the division of function between central and local government agencies at district level becomes clearer.

This approach to local government deserves closer analysis than it has so far been accorded in Zambia, due to its potential contribution to democracy and efficiency. These two ideals are not naturally opposed. It has become a universal principle of administration and development that the more involved people become in an activity the greater are the energies conducive to its success that can be released. The integrated local government system has the merit of attracting maximum citizenship participation and support, whilst ensuring that the unit is a visible instrument for the implementation of policy. This is less certain with the present system in which all the dynamism is concentrated in the hands of the central government. Why? The most important single cause is the lack of adjustment, a time-lag, in official thinking between the needs of the past and present. There is no longer any necessity why the central government should have politico-security agents in the field concealing their true activities beneath their more formal duties as development co-ordinators. There are other specialist arms of the government which can perform these roles. Further, government area co-ordinators are only necessary for as long as the

central government continue to execute technical services at the field level and thereby manifest its distrust of local government to do the same.

There have been two lines of continuity in this country. First is the field administration of the central government and the second is the search for a local government system which is both a good instrument for development and representative. This second line of activity may never reach its goal, unfortunately, because of the pre-eminent position accorded to the field administration of the government due to anachronistic thought. Were the field administrators transplanted from the central to the local government area there would be more hope for development from below.

Local Finance in Developing Countries

by K. VENKATARAMAN

TWO QUESTIONS arise from the title and we could cover substantial ground by trying to answer them. Is it too early to take up the problems of local finance in developing countries? Is local finance in developing countries different from local finance in developed countries, and if so, in what ways?

It may be argued that developing countries are still in the process of coming to grips with their national finance, that their financial structures have not yet taken a settled shape, and that it would be premature to concern outselves with problems of local finance. It may be pointed out that many developing countries are only now beginning to establish local government institutions in the modern sense and it is only after the pattern of these institutions is settled that the problems of local finance will become concrete. Let us examine the possible dangers of such views.

Admittedly, neither local administration nor local finance can be more important than national administration or national finance of which they form a part. But it is not precisely because of this that their importance is underestimated in more than legitimate measure? Local administration and local finance are comparatively uninspiring fields of analysis and their problems rarely come to the fore, unless they virtually compel attention for some reason or other. The result is there is invariably a lag between the origin of problems and the attention to them in these fields.

What are the reasons for the establishment of local governments? If they require the achievement of specific aims, should they not have the requisite financial endowment for this purpose? To begin with, a reason that is often important is that local governments serve as training grounds in democracy, as the primary schools of politics. It is easy to panegyrise this or shrug it off as naive self-deception. But it ought to be agreed generally that local bodies could serve as springs of leadership and also enable national leadership to be broad based. Could this aim be achieved, if local bodies remain only in name, with no financial endowment to provide them with substance? Lack of finance and consequent atrophy will only make such leadership as emanates feel a sense of impotence. It will make it think that the art of local government does not lie locally but consists in pulling strings, at the state headquarters for increased financial allotments. Frustrated leadership finds it easy to flow into short cuts and devious channels; it gets an early taste of corruption which it carries as it goes up the political ladder. When finances are limited, provision of services becomes a matter of communalism or politics. Counter-pressures develop and local affairs begin to assume a disproportionate controversial importance. People in their turn tend to look upon local government as a device to feather someone's nest and their political horizon being limited, they tend to view the national government in a similar way. I am not saying all this happens, or will happen everywhere. But if we neglect local finance largely, when at the same time we choose to have local governments, we are leaving the door wide open for such possibilities.

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Or take the other aspect which receives wider acceptance as a justification for local government – the provision of services. It is admitted on all sides that a central bureaucracy cannot provide essentially local services to the satisfaction of the people (which is more true in developing countries with a dearth of administrative talent); the discretion in detail has to be a local discretion. In the context of the 'revolution of rising expectations' the provision of such services assumes vital importance; in the short run national development plans, to the rural population, will be synonymous with the provision of these services. There is a great demand in developing countries for the provision of health facilities and primary education, and no realistic planner can afford to ignore these social overheads. Most of these services have to go to local government hands sooner or later, but at the same time they involve large outlays, often on a scale the local bodies have never handled before. Here we come across the double-edged problem of local finance. On the one hand, there has to be provision of sufficient aid to local bodies for the satisfactory maintenance of the services and the attainment of plan targets; on the other, there have to be adequate safeguards to ensure that the money is spent properly and the best results are achieved.

There is one connected aspect in which local finance has to keep in step with development. That is the problem of urbanization – rural areas becoming urban and small towns becoming large towns. Urbanization brings problems as well as benefits and these problems, such as sanitation and housing, have to be dealt with concurrently as they arise, if not planned ahead. These are essentially local fields. In such cases the financial base of the local bodies has to be expanded and more grants-in-aid will have to flow. Very often, rural and urban local bodies have different financial set-ups and regulations governing grants-in-aid. The urbanizing local bodies would have therefore to be properly 'classified' and taken care of if the problems of urbanization are to be kept in check; and they may require a 'most-favoured' financial deal from the central government. In this sense, local finance cannot wait for 'better times'.

We now come to the third important aspect from which local bodies can be looked at from the national level. That is, local bodies can in some respects be engines of economic development. Though it is true in a limited sphere only, it is better not to under-estimate its importance. This is an aspect which has become better known after the publication of U.K. Hicks' *Development from Below*.[1] For one thing, economic development plans for rural areas often consist of a series of small projects spread throughout the country, and only local bodies can be agencies of implementation of such projects. The building of village roads, the provision of wells and the construction of primary school buildings are all cases in point. Or take the case of agriculture, where many improvements which can substantially increase productivity require only little application of capital, but have to be brought home to the farmer. Such extension work is likely to achieve better results under the aegis of local bodies, for the influence and example of prominent local people will be behind it.

In a wider and more general sense, local bodies are valuable instruments for the provision of 'external economies' to the rural peasant economies. They thus help accelerate the transition from the subsistence economy to an exchange economy. The building of village roads and the consequent enlargement of the market is a case in point. Local bodies can help mobilize capital formation also.

[1] Oxford University Press, 1961; 35s.

We have the suggestion of the late Ragnar Nurkse that disguised unemployment has disguised savings potential; that if the surplus farm workers are siphoned off for capital formation and can be made to work on the building of roads, etc. there would be a new source of capital formation. This suggestion may no doubt have practical difficulties, but if there is any institutional arrangement at all that can secure such mobilization, it is the local bodies.

Thus there are effective ways in which local bodies can be used for the cause of economic development. There is this belief, implicit and unexpressed, in the many-sided activities of the Panchayati Raj institutions in India. But it is as well to remember that we are only at the periphery of this aspect of local government. We do not have clear-cut examples of the process of economic development being substantially accelerated through local governments. Nor are we sure in any way of the manner in which the spark of enthusiasm and activity could jump from the planner to the local élite and from the local élite to the people at large. But there is no doubt there that is a vast reserve of local enthusiasm that can be harnessed for economic development and the problem is to find the key to the flood-gates. The strategy of development, as Hirschman has impressed on us, consists in setting up pacing devices, pressures and inducement mechanisms that can elicit hidden responses. A search for such devices *vis-à-vis* local bodies, and a study of the motivation between local bodies and the local population will definitely be rewarding.

Thus there is a sense in which the money spent on local bodies can be considered to be an enormously productive investment rather than as an unavoidable item of expenditure of a low priority, to be grudgingly allowed with a cynical shrug of shoulders. Local bodies can in fact be viewed as 'multi-purpose economic institutions'.[2] From this angle, local finance will be seen in an entirely different light.

It may be argued that the claims made for local bodies are based on what they might be, rather than on what they are. The answer is that they are what they are partly because they never receive a fair financial deal. Besides, there is no straight and narrow path to economic development and it can never proceed without experimentation; no one is sure how rural peasant economies could be activated and local bodies could be a possible *primum mobile*.[3]

All this is in answer to our first question, the answer being that it is not premature to consider the question of local finance in developing countries; on the other hand, it may be worthwhile to consider local bodies as a tool in development strategy. But there is one other aspect in which local finance demands attention in developing countries. It is that local finance can serve to diversify the tax structure of the economy. A deepening and widening of the tax structure is inevitable in the course of economic development, and this process has necessarily to take place at all levels. Peasants, besides, are known to be notoriously hard to tax but it is often by the taxation of peasants and eliciting a food surplus thereby to feed the labour force at construction and manufacture that economic development gathers momentum. Japan, for example, had a stiff land tax for a considerable period. Local bodies tying local taxation to local benefits will be able to achieve this aim much better, in a democratic set-up,

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[2] *Cf.* 'Multi-purpose Economic Institutions in Africa' by R. H. Green, in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 163-184. Green however deals only with local direct taxation.

[3] The author personally feels that in many developing countries the difference between success and failure of developmental efforts is largely a function of the commitment of the vast rural population to development.

than distant central governments spreading their benefits thinly far and wide. Though the tendency in modern finance is for the increasing centralisation of the levy and collection of taxes, there is a stratum of the tax base, particularly land and property taxes, which has to be applied locally and it is through this base that the rural population can be taxed effectively.

We have canvassed the claims of local finance in developing countries at some length for the simple reason that they are often easily overlooked. Local finance is in fact like a shy lad lost in a crowd of more important and obstreperous adults in the market place of development policies. The problems of local administration and local finance are best dealt with as parts of development strategy instead of being postponed to a convenient date in the future which never arrives. We are perhaps stressing the obvious but, as we shall see, it is the obvious that is often ignored.

We now turn to the second question: Is local finance in developing countries different from that in developed ones? From what we have seen, the institutional utility of local bodies in developing areas has wider ramifications. To that extent, local finance also assumes a greater significance. But, on the whole, the difference is one of degree rather than kind. There is besides a sense in which local government assumes more importance with economic development. The intensity and variety of local services grow as society becomes more and more advanced, and to this extent local finance compels greater attention.

The central problem of local finance is the same, whether a country is developed or developing; that is, the matching of obligations and resources.[4] It is better to view this as the central problem of local finance rather than the maximization of resources or of benefits *per se*. The reason is the obvious one that delegation of functions without devolution of resources will be meaningless if not dangerous. In spite of the self-evident nature of the proposition, an imbalance between functions and finances is common even in developed countries. Even countries like the U.K. and the U.S.A. are not free from such imbalances.

The reason is not only that in any country, whether developed or developing, the levels at which functions can be effectively performed do not coincide with the levels at which taxes can be efficiently imposed and collected. Given the consciousness of the need to match obligations and resources, it is not beyond ingenuity to tackle this disparity by means of a system of grants. The basic reasons often lie elsewhere: local bodies are creatures of statutes of government and their finances depend on the manner in which governments or rather government departments view them; government departments in the nature of things view the local bodies fragmentally in relation to those local activities with which they are concerned; and the only department which can view local finances as a whole, viz., the finance department, cannot be expected to take a healthy view of devolutions to local bodies. Conditions in local bodies, besides, vary from area to area and the collection and collation of the various relevant statistics and their interpretation require time and patience which are not always found. On all counts the government has decidedly the superior hand and local bodies are in the position of Oliver Twist asking for more.

The position will be much worse in developing countries. The paucity of information, the breathless rush of development matters, a possible distrust of these newfangled institutions, combined with the overall scarcity of resources, all militate against proper attention to local finance. In the circumstances what

[4] This is the point of view from which the author considers local finance in his forthcoming book "Local Finance in Perspective" (Asia Publishing House, Bombay).

will surprise one will be a case where proper attention *is* paid to local finance!

There is one other factor which creates such imbalance *an initio*. The determination of local functions is ultimately a matter for policy decision by politicians and once such decisions are taken, the matter more often than not goes straight to the anvil of the legislative draftsman. It is very rarely that a detailed scrutiny of the financial arrangements is made concurrently with the drafting of legislation.[5] The chances then are that in developing countries, the local bodies may be born deformed, unless there is a conscious attempt to decide on a suitable financial framework.

But the decision to match resources with responsibilities is only the beginning; its practical application is beset with difficulties. First of all a decision has to be taken at what level the resources and responsibilities are to be matched. The term 'responsibilities' is a general term but for practical purposes each responsibility has to take a definite quantitative and monetary significance; and the principles of apportionment to individual local bodies has to be fixed. These are important matters which are however beyond the scope of a brief essay.[6] Suffice it to say that a developing country which sets out to match local finances with local functions will have to make a few healthy anticipations and take a few realistic decisions regarding the level of services it proposes to provide for the country. The settlement of local finance will be but the necessary consequence and translation of national objectives for the provision of services to local areas. Local responsibilities in this sense will become defined not *a priori* but by the finance that government is prepared to provide; the yardstick for the success of local government is thus indirectly set and judgment of local government has to be made, not with reference to desirable conditions but with reference to the finances the government has provided.

An equally important consideration is that resources should be so matched to responsibilities that there is some elbow-room for local initiative. If the role we have sought to make out for local bodies in developing countries is correct, then local initiative is a desideratum in developmental strategy. But in tackling this question we come across one of the main dilemmas of local finance. There is a strong case for substantial central control of local bodies in developing countries; the inexperience of local governments and the need to ensure a minimum uniformity of standards of services would warrant such control. But how is such control to be exercised without plugging the springs of local initiative which can be valuable in the developmental attack? There is obviously no simple answer to this question; the more we look at it, the more it presents dilemmas. Those civic amenities for which the people will be prepared to tax themselves will be precisely the amenities which the government would like to ensure by means of grants. Again, local initiative can manifest itself in incurring new expenditure, as well as in incurring more expenditure on an existing service than the government is willing to subsidise. Given the financial limits of elbow-room, which should be encouraged?

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[5] The Study Team on Panchayati Raj Finances in India (Vol. II, p. 10), ruefully says: "We cannot help wishing that when the Acts were passed by legislatures, an attempt had been made to estimate the minimum cost of fulfilling the obligatory functions and to provide resources for the purpose. The actual resources often vary inversely to the number and extent of obligatory functions". This is however, not quite correct in respect of Madras State, where a local finance sub-committee of the Legislature Committee on the Panchayat Act went into the question and framed a 'Perspective Budget of Panchayat Administration'.

[6] An attempt is made in the author's book cited above.

There is no simple or universally applicable solution to these problems. Each situation will call for its own solution and it is precisely here that an agency established solely for the study and management of local financial relations can play an effective part. Obviously local initiative cannot go outside the specific responsibilities assigned to local bodies but there is still a part which it can play within these limits. A developing country which earmarks a specific role for local bodies in its development strategy has to provide room for and encourage local initiative. But the battle between central control and local initiative is a continuing battle and the field is never quiet.

We cannot possibly deal with the questions of grant here, for it is a subject of increasing ramifications. But it is the nature and extent of grants that finally determine the texture of local finance. There are however, one or two other aspects of local finance of which mention should be made; they are not peculiar to developing countries, but their relevance to such countries is very great.

First of all there is the question of incentive; it is not the same as the question of initiative though the two do overlap. Incentive has mostly to be expressed in money terms, like a matching grant for incurring expenditure or raising revenue. The aim very often is to call forth local resources. There is no doubt that there is a great need for incentive mechanisms in developing countries. The local tax base has to be deepened as well as diversified and there should be a built-in element in the system of local finance to ensure this. But such a system of incentives, unless carefully adjusted, will clash with the principle of equalization. Disparities have a tendency to develop and grow, not only at international levels and national levels but at local levels also. The difficulty with expenditure matching grants or revenue matching grants is that they presuppose matchable resources and such resources are invariably more readily forthcoming in areas with a better taxable capacity. Local needs are often proportionate to population but local taxable capacity is not, except in the very simplified case of a poll tax system of local finance. It is generally the land and property taxes that form the bulwark of locally raised resources and the revenue from them differs markedly in rich and poor areas. Land tax in particular is likely to vary with reference to the fertility of the soil as well as the produce of the land. The result is that to raise a given amount of revenue to attract a matching grant, the poorer areas will have to levy much steeper rates of taxation. The need for such higher rates could possibly be obviated by stipulating, if it is practically feasible, a higher extent of local matching for the richer areas than the poorer ones. But even this may not be equitable since, for a given amount of allotment to be utilized against local matchable resources, there will be a larger amount of money and consequently a larger volume of activity in a richer area.

A simple illustration will help. Take two local bodies, A and B, of which A is richer, its local resources being double that of B. Suppose the central government sponsors a scheme for construction of school buildings and offers a 50 per cent. matching grant for this purpose. *Ceteris paribus*, A will be able to construct twice as many school buildings as B. This disparity could be removed by stipulating, say, that local contribution by A will be 50 per cent. whereas local contribution by B will be only 25 per cent. Thus B's local contribution can be as effective as that of A's. But this will still not satisfy the requirements of equity because for a given amount of allotment by the central government, A will be able to build up to the value of twice that amount whereas B can build only up to the value of one and one-third of that amount. The next step will then be to reduce allotments and fix different allotments for different areas. How far

this will be politically feasible is a question for which no standard answer can be given.

In spite of the example given above, we are still only in the periphery of the problem of incentives and the problem of equalization. What we are spotlighting in a limited way is that, while there is an urgent need in developing countries to give attention to both the problems, results, unless carefully watched, can thwart the principle of equalization and to some extent the principle of incentive too. Too often the problems of incentives are thought of in simple uniform terms and the problems of equalization thought of as just providing equal amounts of grants for different areas. Thus ill-thought out measures of incentives and equalization will create more problems than they solve. There seems to be an inherent tendency for the principle of incentive to weigh in favour of the richer areas unless corrected. Arithmetical equalization cannot be achieved because of the multiplicity of local institutions, but it should at least be ensured that the administration does not think that it is equalizing when it actually happens to be doing the opposite.

We have been switching from subject to subject, as our aim is to bring certain major issues in this field into focus, rather than to provide ready-made solutions to what is admittedly a matter for detailed study. From what we have said above it should be clear that a sound system of local finance is largely a matter of keen and perceptive administration. There are a few other connected matters which require examination while considering the question of local finance in developing countries.

We have said enough to make it clear that a satisfactory system of local finance requires the availability of requisite data. Data are hard to come by in developing countries for a variety of reasons. A purposive form of reporting will have to be developed if a cogent picture of local finances in developing countries is to emerge. The absence of this often results in lack of interest in local finance and in the application of half-measures. One of the primary needs in developing countries is therefore to organize the collation of financial data. It can then be integrated with all other financial data and plans of the country. Local bodies may also have to draw up their plan for the "plan period" and for this purpose they will require their financial data in advance.[7]

Another important need is to interest the members of local bodies in matters of finance. The members may know that finances are lacking but they may never know anything more than that; their interest in financial matters is not sustained, but concentrated at the time of the passing of the budget. The budget of the local body may itself require to be planned more carefully and also made intelligible to those who are expected to pass it. The need for thought and action in these directions in developing countries is obvious.

Ignorance and lack of traditions may also result in misdirected or wasteful expenditure. Small local bodies with little staff cannot stand up to destructive or formal audit and the result of such audit may even be to stultify the growth of these institutions; at the same time the need for financial discipline is very great. Hence audit and control have to be two-edged weapons, guiding as well as criticizing.

What we have stated above carries with it certain corollaries regarding personnel. So far as the central government is concerned, a separate agency for

[7] The author begs to be excused for the casual way in which he has dealt with this newly emerging aspect of financial administration. A satisfactory treatment of this aspect would require an essay in itself.

dealing with problems of local finance in one conspectus and with the connected questions of central-local relations is a worthwhile investment in developing countries. The suggestion is also often made that there should be an independent financial commission to fix the devolutions to local bodies. But the trouble is that such commissions cannot really have an independent status and nothing prevents the government from modifying or rejecting its recommendations. Besides, they may in fact make local finance more controversial than it need be. It would suffice if there were a keenness on the part of the government to give a fair financial deal to local bodies. This would be a more viable arrangement than 'independent' commissions in developing countries.

The other implication regarding personnel is that the satisfactory upkeep of financial matters in local bodies requires trained staff. The problem of finding the staff and training them is there, but perhaps more important is the question of how far local bodies can afford the staff. A state subsidy would no doubt solve the problem but the crux of the problem is the question of the size of local bodies.

With a brief mention of this last matter, this cursory survey of the problems of local finance in developing countries must end. The size of local bodies has relevance from the economic as well as the administrative point of view. The problems are specially relevant to developing countries where local bodies are initially set up; another dimension is added to the problem in the case of federations. The effective unit for the performance of local functions is not the same for all the functions; some like education are better dealt with in relatively large units. The result is that different tiers of local bodies have to be created. This complicates the questions of local finance and a proper balancing of resources and responsibilities with due regard to considerations like initiative, incentive and equalization become more difficult. If local bodies should serve as tools of development, the size of the local body has to be relatively small so that it does not become a bureaucracy but has live contact with the people. This is a real problem in many respects and ultimately the size and number of tiers will have to be determined by each developing country with reference to its own circumstances.

The Belgian and British Administrations in Ruanda-Urundi and Tanganyika

A comparative study of their effects on a community divided by an international border

by R. E. S. Tanner

The purpose of this paper is to examine the differences brought about by Belgian and British colonial policies in what were similar social systems, and to study some of the consequences, up to August 1960, of this international border.

The Tanganyika district of Ngara in the West Lake Province and the Ruanda-Urundi district of Muhinga in the Kingdom of Urundi have a common border which, for most of its length, is an arbitrary line following no significant geographical features and cutting through a heavily populated area of similar ecology and social structure. On the Urundi side, the Muhinga district is an outlying part of the Ruanda-Urundi mountain block, of which the Bugufi chiefdom of Ngara district is the easternmost limit. Up to 1914, the German Government held suzerainty over the whole area and the King (*Mwami*) of Burundi, under them, was in control of both sides of the present border. This border, dividing Ruanda-Urundi from Tanganyika, was established by treaty between Belgium and Britain in the early twenties, so that any differences found must have been caused within the last 35 years.

The Mwami of Urundi petitioned the United Nations in 1947 for the Bugufi chiefdom, on the Tanganyika side, to be re-incorporated into his kingdom, on the grounds that prior to the First World War, Bugufi had been a part of his domain. The Commission appointed to adjudicate on the matter decided that, although there may have been some historical grounds for the claim, the twenty-five year separation, and the use of French and English as official languages, made any change in the border inadvisable. Thus the practical factor of different official languages had effectively divided the tribe beyond any possibility of re-unification, although it was ignored by the African protagonists in their evidence to the Commission, who gave, as their main reason for opposition, the unwillingness of the Tanganyika Africans for any change in their administrative system.

The writer held the position of District Commissioner at Ngara at the end of the period in question, and received the assistance of the *Administrateur de Territoire* at Muhinga in the research necessary for this analysis.

I. *Administrative structure*

The British system of administration, up to August 1960, was a descending line of diminishing responsibility, with the Governor at the head with, below him, Minister, Provincial and District Commissioners and, at the lower end of the scale, Chiefs and Native Authorities. Each rank knew his responsibilities and devolution of duties, and a knowledge of English was an increasingly essential

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requirement for any African seeking advancement. The Tanganyika policy of teaching English only in post-primary schools made this initially a scarce asset. The standard of their English was noticeably inferior to the knowledge of French by the comparable Rundi officials.

The Belgian system, with the Governor similarly at the head, was two parallel lines of responsibility. The one consisted of the *Resident* and then *Administrateur*, *Chef* and *Sous-chef* with his council. Parallel to this was the Mwami with his *Conseil du Pays* and *Conseil de Territoire* and, under that, the *Chef* and a *Conseil de Chefferie*. Thus the Mwami headed, and largely controlled, an hierarchical administration of African officials over a population of two millions. The kingdom was divided into a number of chiefdoms, each under a *Chef*, and subdivided again under *Sous-chefs*.

This system, stemming from the Belgian recognition of the Mwami as king, meant that in every-day conduct of affairs the Belgian colonial authorities were not able to enforce their ideas and regulations. This dual system of authority gave the politically agile ample opportunity for successfully playing off one hierarchy against the other. A knowledge of French was an essential requirement for any such person who was politically ambitious and, as French was taught from the bottom form in the Ruanda-Urundi schools, the standard of competence in that language was most noticeable, particularly at the chiefly level.

On the Tanganyika side, the chief of Bugufi was also called *Mwami*, and headed a similar hierarchical administration, but without similar powers. The small size of his chiefdom, with a population of 55,000, gave him a status equivalent to that of a *Sous-chef* in Urundi, and his powers were limited accordingly. He was, nevertheless, not unaware that his status, in a divided community, was markedly above any that he would attain should the area be re-united. There were no essential differences between the two indigenous political systems, as Ngara was only a segment of the Urundi set-up, nor had their structures been fundamentally modified by either government.

It does not seem that any theoretical principles were involved here; in fact, these colonial administrations were tailored to the existing African systems, rather than to pre-conceived national policies. The *Administrateur de Territoire* in Muhinga, in dealing with the Mwami and his administration, seems to have had just as many restrictions on his powers as the British Administrative Officer in Tanganyika during a comparable period.

Administration in the Belgian Congo, where tribal units were sometimes very small, was often based on local councils and the *Administrateur* there had powers and responsibilities parallel to the District Commissioner in Ngara. The systems of government were also modified by the demographic composition of their populations. In Tanganyika, the Indian community, from the beginning, filled the middle grade jobs all over the country, not only because they were sufficiently educated, but because they knew English. In Urundi, there were very few Indians, and even fewer who knew French.

It was therefore essential, since there were no educated Africans available in the early stages of their rule, to recruit overseas Belgians to perform the middle grade jobs, which in Tanganyika were done by Indians. Therefore in the political development of Urundi the grades of government jobs which could be easily Africanized by stages, as indeed was the case in Tanganyika, were held by Belgians. Again the language factor pre-determined these differences. In Tanganyika, English speaking Indians were immediately available; the

solution was so easy that it is possible that it was never even a subject for policy discussions. Similarly, the Belgian solution was the obvious one. Both the middle groups, of Indians and Belgians, were re-graded as the core of sound administration.

Both administrations appeared to have had little effect on their respective African social systems. Such change as did occur was because of European influence in general, rather than Belgian or British activities in particular. It seems that the two social systems, apart from the political aspects, were carried on independently of, and mostly untouched by, European suzerainty. Any imposed change was usually unsuccessful, except where the communities had reached the point of anticipating the change themselves.

Certain laws instituted in Urundi by the Belgians and unknown in Ngara, may have had strong consequences. The institution of cemeteries in 1955 was a fundamental change, as previously burials had taken place in house compounds which were then abandoned, even to the extent of leaving stone houses to fall down; the use of cemeteries thus encouraged better houses to be built and less money to be wasted. This custom did not appear to have had the same force on the British side, where burials took place in house compounds or nearby, but a few moves took place.

Bride-wealth was restricted by law in Urundi but, like the 1961 law forbidding polygamy, it had little effect, except that the excess bride-wealth paid in the former case, and any bride-wealth for polygamous wives or claims over adultery and child ownership in the latter, could not be dealt with in the courts. No such laws had been instituted or considered on the Tanganyika side, and it seemed that they were too much in advance of contemporary social ideas to be successful.

In Urundi, there were laws, until 1960, for the compulsory cultivation not only of reserve crops for famine relief, such as cassava, but for the normal seasonal crops as well, and for cash crops of coffee in the highlands and cotton in the lowlands. On the Ngara side, there had been laws for the compulsory cultivation of cassava for famine food reserve, and for coffee bushes to be maintained in the correct manner, but these rules were abolished in 1958. The point should be made that the Belgians legislated for progress far more widely than the British ever did even at the height of their power. While the British could not be said to have a *laissez-faire* system, Belgium administered a "rule of law" system, imposed from above, which involved no pre-disposing process of change within the people to whom it was applied.

In Urundi, it was the law that the tenant farmer should work for his landlord for twelve days per year, without payment, but in Muhinga, it was customary, and had the support of the local courts, that the tenant should work two days per week for the landlord; this continued up to June 1960, when the tenants refused to do this work and, although landlords obtained court judgments in their favour, it was no longer possible for them to enforce these rights. The comparable privileges of landlords on the Ngara side had been progressively reduced by administrative action from the middle twenties, until they were finally abolished by the Bugufi Land Rules, 1954, when the community itself had begun to realize that these changes were necessary. Possibly the only law which was common to both sides, was for the compulsory making and maintaining of hedges and ridges on hillsides to prevent erosion.

In Urundi, up to 1955, the salaries of African administrative officials were related to the number of tax-payers controlled by each authority, and a roughly

similar, but uncontrolled system lay behind the Tanganyika salaries, which were organized on a district and not on a territorial basis. In 1955, a sliding salary scale was introduced in Urundi for such officials, with additional allowances of 300 francs for a wife and 150 francs for each child. In Ngara, salary scales for positions above that of headman were only introduced in the late fifties, without any additional allowances, and the scales were considerably lower than those in Urundi. It seems that the Urundi system may have initiated an African local civil service, interested in their position for the direct financial benefits involved. The benefits of local civil service employment on the Ngara side were either indirect, through the misuse of their position, or just the pleasure of power. No-one could have considered taking office for the salaries and official benefits involved.

In the development of local government in Urundi, it has often been assumed that the Belgian government educated the Tutsi, the aristocratic Hamitic caste controlling the country, as a deliberate policy of maintaining the Tutsi-dominated *status quo*. There was in fact no such deliberate preference, but the Tutsi saw early the advantages of education, principally in terms of French and its political uses, and purposefully pursued it. It does seem, however, that their children were cleverer than those of the Hutu, the Bantu masses composing 90 per cent. of the population, in terms of examination successes, although a contributory fact may have been that the Tutsi did not start drinking at an early age and were on a diet of less beer and more milk!

In the functioning of local councils, there seems to have been little difference, as both systems were dominated by central government officials, and were only useful or, indeed, fully used where the the chiefs were strong. Unofficial majorities in these councils were instituted within a year, in the two districts. A very important difference, which will be stressed again later, is that there was, on the British side, some underlying obligation to consult the people. The institution of elections, however imperfect, in the early fifties, made Ngara local authority years in advance of the Rundi in the practice of government.

The main reason for the lifelessness of local councils in Urundi was the lack of financial elasticity. It was not possible to increase tax, since the tax burden was already heavy (probably twice that of Ngara on comparable incomes), or to tax less, because recurrent expenses left little over for capital improvements. In committee work, the Ngara councils were able to progress towards reasonable efficiency over a period of years, so that they developed a corpus of elected councillors who had some knowledge of the functioning of local government and of its problems. On the Muhinga side where there was no obligation to consult, and no committee work, there was no developing process leading towards a practical local government system at lower levels.

II. Administrative practice

There were strong differences between the two governments, not so much in their deliberate policies, in which of course there were marked and fundamental divergencies, but in the background atmosphere in which they functioned.

In general, the Ruanda-Urundi administration appeared to be both complicated and interfering; it wanted to do everything for the people, without considering the sociological implications of what was being done or the confusion caused by the failure to teach the relationship between taxes and benefits in local government. An example of this was the building of seed stores in

chiefdoms, so that, in the event of famine, seed would be available for planting of the next season's crop, but, in local custom, a man who was so improvident as to have eaten his seed would have lost status.

In Tanganyika, the government only interfered in the greater issues, more tactfully but less effectively. An example of this, was the sleeping sickness measures taken by the two governments; wherever the disease occurred in Ruanda-Urundi, the whole population was examined twice a year, and each person carried a record card for this purpose; such enormous work entailed the existence of a large, specially recruited medical and administrative staff. On the Tanganyika side, in Kigoma, nothing particular was done for the same epidemic other than a weakly-enforced ban on movement between the infected areas with the underlying idea that, by and large, it was the infected man's fault if he was not cured, since adequate hospital facilities were available, and propaganda about the disease and its prevention and cure had been carried on for years.

Further, in Urundi there were several taxes for individual purposes, such as the annual payment of 15 francs for twice-yearly D.D.T. house spraying, for which there were no Ngara parallels. The Urundi Government seemed too involved with a great amount of routine work, which was further complicated by much bureaucratic formality.

There were also differences in the traditions of the administrative services. The British had a wider tradition of service during the colonial period; there were transfers between countries and a wider experience of problems and their possible solutions. The Belgians, on the other hand, were posted to the Ruanda-Urundi service and, with the possible exception of the Congo, their experience was limited. Their home government had a tradition of centralization, with no experience of committee work, which appears to be the only manner in which African local authorities could begin to function. On the British side, the District Commissioner was never in command of departmental officers, he was chairman of the district team, no more than *primus inter pares*. With the Belgians, there was no such consultative body; the *Administrateur de Territoire* met departmental officers individually and directed their activities. The position and power of the District Commissioner was never clearly defined and, although he was responsible for law and order within the framework of his legal power and for the prevention and control of famine, his success was related more to his personal influence and the backing of the Provincial Commissioner than to any control over the activities of other government departments. The *Administrateur de Territoire*, however, saw the annual confidential reports on departmental officers and commented on their general efficiency.

The British officials, if only nostalgically, were envious of the Belgians' authority to enforce what they considered to be the right policy without understanding the extent to which, in practice, it was whittled away by circumstances quite beyond the control of any authoritarian structure. The Belgian officials, on the other hand, were equally envious of the British officials' role, which they saw as evidence of political maturity, ignoring the fact that it was largely dictated by under-staffing, lack of money and a relative indifference to solutions other than high level political ones.

Another factor, harder to define, seemed to be the unobtrusiveness of the British administration. They were rarely mentioned by the Rundi in discussion, even by thousands who passed through Ngara every year on their way to Buganda. On the Muhinga side, officialdom seemed to be about much more

and their stamp was on the countryside everywhere. This distinction was based on the very clear fact that the British had done little development work; Ngara had no cattle dips and coffee pulperies while Muhinga had seventeen of the former and thirty-three of the latter.

Although there can be little doubt that Muhinga was a better area to live in for wealth and health (the whole district was compulsorily immunized against polio at about the same time as the vaccine was beginning to be used in England), it is interesting that few persons ever made this comparison, but repeatedly stressed the skill and success of the British in their political adjustments, almost as if this was the only factor worth comparing.

III. Political development

The geographical positions of the two districts were of fundamental importance in their political development. The Muhinga district, on the border of Ruanda-Urundi, was only 50 miles from Kitega, the capital of Urundi, and within five days drive of almost any point in this country containing five millions. The inhabitants of Muhinga never thought it worthwhile to work things out for themselves; it was easier to go to Kitega, the capital, for a solution. The senior chief's ambitions were in the capital, not locally; other politicians were interested in their positions on the *Conseil du Pays*, not on the local *Conseil de Territoire*. In fact, it is possible to generalize that no-one of importance was interested in politics at the local level, and that there was only local interest when the individual, because of clan considerations for example, realized that he stood no chance in national politics.

Ngara, on the other hand, was on the western edge of Tanganyika, 250 miles from the provincial headquarters and over 900 miles from the capital, the administrative and political heart of the country. This was not only a geographical independence, but caused a more independent frame of mind, both in the inhabitants and in the central and local government servants.

Thus the border, by its existence, gave a great opportunity to Bugufi, which was able to develop itself politically to a limited extent, because it was cut off from the main current of national life. The important persons in Ngara had allies amongst the party politicians in the capital, but did not consider themselves as playing a part there. The border had given them a status of their own, and its abolition would have resulted in those same politicians having to be hangers-on in the Urundi capital only two hours' drive away.

In the development of political activity in Urundi, it is considered that 1951 was the point of change, when the progressive elements, literate in French, decided that they could no longer depend on the Mwami to change his traditional system into the political form they expected. A useless man was made a *Sous-chef* because of his family connection with, and on the insistence of, the Mwami. This was done despite a suitable *évolué* candidate and in the face of *évolué* protests. It may have led indirectly to the *évolués'* supporting the U.P.R.O.N.A. party, once they considered that there was no hope of preferment for them in the present Urundi official structure. The educated appeared, from then on, to have lost faith in the Mwami as an instrument for egalitarian social development and for promotion, by merit, within civil service. The people themselves were probably indifferent to this issue as, if they had to have a chief whom they did not know, they would have preferred a kinsman of the Mwami.

It would be wrong to consider that these appointments were made, and parties formed, in response to social pressures within the community and in

opposition to Belgian suzerainty. The Urundi system was feudal, and most political action stemmed from leading personalities, owing its continuity to the traditional system of checks and balances.

On the Tanganyika side there was never any conception of, or official policy tending towards, the creation of a separate educated class. The educated English-speaking African was encouraged to join any central government department and, in the appointments to local authorities, places were available for anyone with suitable qualifications and the requisite local support. The absence of an educated class, at that stage, dissatisfied with both central and local governments, must have been a contributory factor to the development of the Tanganyika African National Union, first as a national party and then as a one-party government. The local effects were that, in Ngara, the educated African fought for power within the structure of this party and had no chance of creating, or even supporting, a second party.

In Muhinga, the Rundi felt themselves superior to their brothers across the border. They had their own Mwami and in their opinion, the Bugufi chief did not amount to much. In fact, in meetings between the Tanganyika Africans and British with the senior Rundi over the border, it was often difficult not to feel uncouth, because of the latter's good clothes and flashy cars. The fact of well-dressed African chiefs, speaking excellent French, was difficult to assimilate after the far-from-aristocratic appearance of Tanganyika chiefs, speaking indifferent English. The latter, of course, would stress their English to assert their status and difference, just as the former stressed their French. Issues were considered in terms of language differences rather than tribal unities.

IV. Judicial systems

The judicial systems in the two districts were widely different. The Tanganyika system was that of local courts with African magistrates, with powers up to two years imprisonment; above whom was an appeal ladder, through District and Provincial Commissioner, to a Central Appeal Board, on which a High Court judge sat. The Central Government's courts, for cases of greater seriousness and for law not defined as being suitable for trial by the local courts, started at district level, where the District Commissioner was a magistrate, with appeal to the High Court. A relatively simple system which worked adequately.

In Ruanda-Urundi, there was a much more complicated system. The Mwami of Urundi's court headed a system of civil courts, which was not integrated into the Central Government's system and its policies, as there was no appeal from him to a Central Government court. In penal cases, there was one system, with local courts at the bottom, and Belgian magistrates at the higher levels, but at the two lower levels, their judicial powers were severely limited; two months imprisonment for the African court and six months for the *Administrateur de Territoire*. This placed an enormous load on the remaining court at the centre, as, apart from the administrative work involved, its magistrates did not circulate to district headquarters to try cases as they did in Tanganyika.

Until 1960 the *Administrateur de Territoire* had no powers over Europeans, if they did not plead guilty. Indeed, Europeans were put in a separate prison, which was not the case in Tanganyika. There was no provision for bail in criminal cases; inquests by administrative officers were compulsory for all unusual deaths, and there was no provision for certifying that an inquest was not necessary.

The legal and administrative system was essentially based on Belgian precedents, and when they ruled that every African must carry an identity book, they were doing no more than instituting a system in Ruanda-Urundi already in force in Belgium.

Features of the Tanganyika system such as bail, comparatively high sentences given by courts sitting in the area of the crime, no racial distinctions in criminal cases involving Europeans and Indians, were frequently admired not only by Belgian officials, but by the Rundi as well.

In Tanganyika, the administration and police were separate at the higher levels, and although in some areas officers had to carry out dual functions, their legal powers were differentiated. This separation was always government's policy and, over the years, it was progressively applied at lower and lower levels, so that most chiefs, although empowered to try cases, left the administration of justice to professional non-hereditary African magistrates.

In Ruanda-Urundi, based on the Belgian tradition of state prosecution, there was no such separation of judicial and police functions. Police work was carried out by administrative officers, even to the extent of making arrests with the help of tribal policemen; there was no separate police office and no system of separate police files.

There were no European police officers, except in Usumbura, until 1960, when one was posted to Muhinga. The *Force Publique* was not a police force but was used to guard the prison and office and, occasionally, to make dangerous arrests.

V. Trading across the border

Official trade influences were typified by the fact that the Belgians had an imposing customs post at the border, for the levying of dues on outward and inward trade, while the British had a notice directing those who had dues to pay to make a diversion of 15 miles from the main road, in order to pay them, a direction which was rarely followed except by Europeans and occasionally alien Indians; as in other spheres, the Belgian regulations were too draconian and, although they may have resulted in some increase in revenue, their main practical function was to delay and hinder trade, and to force a high proportion of it into illegal channels.

Up to twenty thousand Rundi passed through Ngara every year going to Uganda, with March as the peak month. On the Muhinga side, there was no public transport at all, as the Belgian administration felt that to allow buses would give a monopoly to Indians, which could be discriminatory against Africans. Everyone walked to the border, where they were picked up by Tanganyika buses, owned by both Indians and Africans.

On their return, these men tended to make purchases of consumer goods at the nearest place in Tanganyika to their homes, where they could use shillings earned in Uganda. Many taxes in Muhinga were paid in East African currency, a practice which only stopped when the Congo franc depreciated in value after independence. This in turn resulted in shillings being hoarded and fewer consumer goods being purchased in Ngara. Tanganyika traders exported Japanese cloth and patent medicines to Urundi, where the latter were prohibited. The Muhinga traders exported hides, petrol, cigarettes, beer and matches. In both cases, the reason was the favourable price differential.

The unfenced border, combined with the Belgian dues and documentation, meant that almost everyone, including the administrative officers, was involved

in some form of illegality. Smuggling was a major and profitable activity but neither administration did much catching of smugglers and goods unless they literally tripped over them.

Smuggling to the Tanganyika side was prompted by the fact that their supplies of beer and cigarettes were both inadequate in quality and quantity in comparison with Urundi goods. Possibly six hundred crates of beer came over the border each month and comparable quantities of cigarettes. The Bugufi Coffee Co-operative Union had a monopoly for the purchase of coffee in Ngara but, because of the delays between the initial sums paid on purchase and the final payments made when the co-operative's books were closed for the year, as much as half of the crop was carried illegally over the border to Urundi and sold there for cash, regardless of whether the price was the same or substantially below the Ngara price.

The border has thus created a trading community of both Africans and Indians financially dedicated to its continued existence. Even if Bugufi chiefdom had been re-incorporated into Urundi the potential profits from the border would have created similar communities 25 miles further north-east. Unguarded borders are an invitation to initiative.

VI. Social contacts across the border

African social contacts were not as infrequent as their spoken fear of border-crossing suggested. There was a constant movement backwards and forwards for beer parties, food exchanges and marriages, in which many families had a foot-hold on both sides, particularly as cattle movement was not as difficult as the people tended to imply and because cattle were not taxed in Ngara. It may be that these movements were between immediate neighbours over the border and that there was, in fact, a marked reluctance to move far into Urundi because the Belgians were considered meddlesome, with their documentation which required passes and permits for movement in both directions.

On the Tanganyika side, there was no law against African movement in or out of the country, and in Ngara notice was only taken of such movement if the person stayed more than six months. Africans in Ngara who wished to travel could obtain a 'Road Pass' for use over the border, but it was in no sense compulsory, and was only issued on demand for that person's convenience. Official social contacts were very intermittent and seemed to be initiated more by the British and there was little informal contact, although both communities would have benefited greatly by this, as the two stations were only 40 miles apart. Football teams travelled between the two administrative stations quite frequently but they appeared, on both sides, to be composed more of detribalized persons than of pure Hangaza and Rundi. All this movement was essentially activity involving persons of little political power – the average peasant, the man who did not speak French, the smuggler who wanted to keep quiet. Nobody involved in the struggle for political power, in either country, had any use for cross-border contacts and saw no point in such visits. The men with power stood with their backs to the border and looked inwards.

VII. Conclusions

Both administrations tried to deal with the African authorities in their areas on a pragmatic basis, which was *not* closely allied to the fundamental principles of their respective countries. This pragmatic approach, however, was intensely

national, with the Belgians overdoing their "welfare work", pre-occupied with the rule of law and the minutiae of a detailed administration. The British, with no authoritarian tradition in their own country, were less concerned with legislating change and providing a detailed alien system of administration. They had no love of paper work for its own sake and, in comparison to the Belgians, they were relatively unobtrusive. Tanganyika, to them, was just another country working towards self-government, a repetitive process, which was boring more than anything else; for the Belgians, with only one colony, questions of prestige came into play. The Africans were fully conscious of the differences in these two attitudes.

It is doubtful, however, whether this division of authority over one community has had any lasting social effect and the purely European aspects of administration, the pre-occupation with paper and impartiality, will be forgotten sooner rather than later. The one fact which has separated them is their official languages; those in power in Urundi are French speaking and those on the Tanganyika side, English specaking. Although some local connection may be maintained in their joint vernacular, they are firmly separated by their official languages and by their educational systems in those languages. So far it seems that the border, although separating the two communities officially, has had no effect on their social lives; Muhinga certainly has lost nothing by being cut off from Ngara by this international border; it has never had a life of its own anyway and its nearness to its own capital has effectively prevented any genuine local development.

Ngara, on the other hand, cut off from the inhibiting influence of a nearby capital and distant from Tanganyika's centre of power, has been able to develop politically and economically at a far faster rate. While not suggesting that this development has been very marked, Ngara has certainly benefited from its geographical position, with an independent frame of mind and an individuality of its own, since ecologically and socially, it was not allied to its eastern lowland neighbours.

The border, together with the absence of repressive legislation and lower taxation on the British side has meant that the Ngara people have the best of both worlds, being able to trade with two different systems. They, being nearer the coast, could attract trade by higher buying and lower selling prices, so that the border became a source of activity, rather than a preventive barrier.

Such economic and political effects as can be noted appear to have been fortuitous and are mainly on the Ngara side, where there has been greater political advancement than in Muhinga.

Quarterly Notes

MOROCCO – *The African Centre for Administrative Training and Research in Development, Tangier.*

A conference to inaugurate the African Centre for Administrative Training and Research in Development (CAFRAD) was held in Tangier between the 23rd and 28th March, 1965. It was attended by seventeen African countries,[1] delegates from European countries and the U.S.A. and experts from various international organizations.

The proposal to establish an African centre for administrative studies originated with the King of Morocco, and his government sought support for it among certain members of UNESCO. A resolution, authorizing the Director-General to assist in the setting up of such a centre in Tangier, was adopted at the twelfth session of the UNESCO General Conference.

The main purposes of the Centre are research, training and documentation. The present intention is to concentrate on research, and to undertake training by occasional seminars on problems which are already the subject of research. As a result of consultations with the Economic Commission for Africa, it seems probable that CAFRAD will become the main administrative documentation centre for Africa. The initial cost of establishing the Centre is being met by the Moroccan Government, UNESCO and the United Nations.

TURKEY – *CENTO Symposium on the Role of Local Government in National Development (Ankara).*

This conference, in February, 1965, was held under the auspices of the Economic Committee of the Central Treaty Organization, and was attended by delegates from all five member countries (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Britain and the U.S.A.). Papers read and discussed covered a wide range of local government subjects – organization, administration, finance, development, and the special problems of urban government.

Members of the Symposium made a number of recommendations which may be summarized as follows:–

1. Local government should be the concern of a separate ministry or of a department, exclusively devoted to the establishment and promotion of local government, within a suitable ministry.
2. That Turkey, Iran and Pakistan should set up clearing houses for information, training and research services in the field of local government.
3. There should be progressive delegation of functions from the centre to local authorities capable of assuming them, together with the necessary financial provision to enable those functions to be carried out effectively.
4. Appropriate action should be taken to maintain a balance between urban and rural development.

[1] Algeria, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and Zambia.

5. Effective land reform is an essential pre-requisite to the proper development of local government.
6. Wide-scale studies, preferably under the auspices of the United Nations, should be made of common problems such as local government finance and the uncontrolled growth of urban areas.

UNITED KINGDOM — *Course in Public Administration at Manchester University*

The Department of Overseas Studies at the University of Manchester is arranging a five-month course in public administration for civil servants from Latin-American countries from September, 1965 to March, 1966. The course will keep classroom lectures to the minimum, and most of the instruction will be through seminars, syndicates, tutorials and field work. Because of the high level of individual participation expected on the course, the number of members will be limited to fifteen, or twenty at the most.

The syllabus will include the following subjects: administrative practice; the machinery of government; administration for development; integration of development planning; research methodology and the use of statistics; work attachments to central and local government departments, industrial companies and trade unions; study projects; and general studies and visits.

The course will qualify for technical assistance from the British Government. In the case of nominees sponsored by the Organisation of American States, however, the cost of passages will be met by that Organisation.

Book Reviews

INDUSTRIALISATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: Report of the 1964 Cambridge Conference, edited by Ronald Robinson. *Obtainable from The Secretary, Overseas Studies Committee, The Old Schools, Cambridge*, 1965; pp. iv and 203; 15s. post free.

In his introduction, the chairman, Dr. R. E. Robinson, says that "The fourth Cambridge conference on development problems, to which ministers, senior officials, economic experts and business executives from twenty-nine African, Asian and Caribbean countries came, was remarkable, partly because Asian and Latin American experts joined us for the first time, partly because members in the main were more senior, so that discussion took place at a higher level, partly because industrialisation – the subject which Nigerians had suggested at the 1963 gathering – arouses passionate interest all over the world". This publication includes the chairman's impressions, running to fifty pages, and fourteen of the eighteen papers read at the conference. Dr. Arnold Rivkin argued clearly, with a wealth of supporting references, for a balanced policy, avoiding "industrialisation at-all-cost" and solidly improving the agricultural base. Mr. Khalid Ikram put the Pakistani belief, not shared by others in Asia, for concentrating on industry rather than agriculture. Dr. Schumacher followed with his idea of "intermediate technology" on the level of £70 – £100 equipment cost per average workplace as a method of industrial advance in developing, heavily populated economies. All three papers are examined in the Latin American setting by Mr. de Figueiredo but, interesting though that is, it is to be regretted that the reader does not benefit from the more general discussion at the conference of these three basic papers. "As drama", says the chairman, "the confrontation of these two opinions in the persons of Dr. Kaldor and Dr. Schumacher rivalled that between Dr. Rivkin and Mr. Ikram". How tantalizing neither to have heard the debate nor be able now to turn up a Cambridge Hansard! Mr. Percy Selwyn opened the discussion of markets and the location of industry with a paper on regional planning showing first-hand experience of the problems and raising the pertinent questions. How did Dr. K, Dr. S, Dr. R and all the others answer them? Mr. David Fiennes of the Commonwealth Development Corporation read a comparable paper on the role of public enterprise in the provision of capital and initiative for industrial development. The debate on his four questions must have been lively as it must also have been on Mr. Rashid Ibrahim's attempt to trace the impact of industrialisation on culture in developing countries. He concludes: "Unfortunately, little concern has been shown for cultural implications and cultural aspects by the planners of underdeveloped countries themselves. Much deeper thinking is needed on their part, as they alone can best understand their people and prescribe for them". The Cambridge Conference would justify itself if it did no more than spark off that deeper thinking. Publication of fourteen of the papers, along with the chairman's report, is greatly to be welcomed. But it would be even better if the debates could have been reported also. The present volume whets one's appetite for more.

D. J. MORGAN.

THE CIVIL SERVICE IN NEW AFRICAN STATES, by A. L. Adu, *George Allen & Unwin Limited*, 1965; pp. 240; 25s.

This is a very interesting and valuable book which will be read with pleasure by many people interested in colonial administration, especially in Africa, and with profit by all those still professionally concerned; copies should certainly be supplied to all British officers newly appointed to the service of African governments. Mr. Adu began his service in Ghana, where he became Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service, was subsequently Secretary of the East African Common Services Organization, and is now the Regional Representative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board in East Africa; he therefore has first-hand experience of the subject matter of his book; and it is scarcely surprising that his diagnoses and prescriptions are those which one would expect from an experienced Colonial administrator with long service in British territories. The merit of Mr. Adu's book is not originality, but the skilful and interesting presentation of a mass of useful material.

Two of the most interesting chapters are chapter 2 "Historical Perspectives" and chapter 15 "The Civil Service in Contemporary Africa"; in the former Mr. Adu briefly records the origin and nature of the African civil services before independence, and the limited scope of their work compared with the much wider range of functions which the civil service is obliged to undertake in contemporary Africa, which is described in chapter 15. For example, on page 15 of chapter 2, Mr. Adu writes:

"The Civil Service was, therefore, geared to the rather negative policy of preventing trouble and bringing the Pax Britannica to all the dependent territories overseas. It was not, until comparatively recently, concerned with economic and social development as a major objective of administration. Economic services were lacking in strength and purpose. Except where immigrant populations had settled, there were no developments towards industrialization. Economic activities were mainly in the hands of private trading companies from overseas – usually Britain. These were primarily interested in the sale of manufactured trade goods and the purchase of local agricultural produce. Such industries as developed were mainly concerned with the exploitation of mineral resources. A few companies established plantations for the supply of such products as rubber, palm-oil and other vegetable oils for their factories in the metropolitan countries. The central administration had no positive policy towards the promotion of these economic services except to create the conditions under which private enterprise could flourish, and to intervene where necessary to ensure fair play to the unsophisticated peoples of the territories".

And on pages 226 to 227 of chapter 15:

"Now, however, all African States have got to concern themselves with major matters and problems of a variety and complexity that would test the abilities of the most mature Civil Servants of any country. All African governments promise to work for the raising of the standard of life of their peoples and they all, as a matter of priority, embark on the preparation and carrying out of comprehensive development plans. The preparation of such plans, which shall provide for balanced development in economic, social and cultural fields, so that the increase in the national income and therefore government revenue is able to pay for the non-productive services, is a very complicated matter and requires a degree of sophisticated economic, statistical

and professional knowledge not easily available to African countries".

Former colonial civil servants will accept this contrast, and many will regret that much more attention and money were not devoted to development in various fields before the African territories attained self-government.

Chapters 3, "The Machinery of Government"; 4, "The Structure of the Civil Service"; 5, "The Administration of the Civil Service"; and 6, "Recruitment and Training", contain a mass of useful information. Mr. Adu's discussion of the proper location of the Establishment Department (pages 61 to 63) is of particular interest, especially the following passage on page 62:–

> "The Treasury, by its nature, is cautious and deliberate in its functions. And yet, in the special circumstances of a developing Civil Service in a period of transition a dynamic approach to the shaping of the service to bring it into consonance with the other measures of development – political, economic and social – is essential. Until more stable conditions have been established, therefore, it might be difficult for Treasury administration of the Service to carry out the wishes of the Government".

Chapter 6, "Recruitment and Training"; and 7, "The Africanization Policy and Programme", are among the most interesting in the book. In the former Mr. Adu (like many other informed Africans) deprecates the British Government's policy of introducing compensation schemes for expatriate officers at independence, on the ground that this encouraged retirement and deprived the territories of expatriate staff they needed; the author looks at the matter more from the point of view of the territory concerned than of the expatriate officer. On pages 84 and 85 he writes:

> "From time to time, proposals were made to place Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service on a permanent basis with careers, emoluments and pensions guaranteed by the United Kingdom Government. Members of this Service could then be seconded, on request, to the new independent states to help them maintain existing services at an adequate level and to promote new development programmes. Technical, and no doubt what appeared to United Kingdom eyes to be sound, reasons were advanced against the establishment of such a scheme. One cannot help feeling, however, that if the United Kingdom had adopted a more progressive approach to its responsibilities as an imperial power, a constructive and realistic solution would have been found".

Former Colonial civil servants will share these views. Later on page 85, Mr. Adu hands a bouquet to the Department of Technical Co-operation (now the Ministry of Overseas Development) for the work in finding new staff for the African Governments.

Chapter 8 is a good account of the functions and problems of the Public Service Commission, and contains an interesting discussion of the familiar question whether on independence an executive public service commission or one advisory to the Prime Minister or President is preferable. The author reaches the sensible (though imprecise) conclusion that "in the long run, it is much healthier to introduce a system on similar principles to those in the United Kingdom which would result in a commonsense arrangement for giving Ministers participation in the responsibilities which would otherwise be left entirely in the hands of an executive Public Service Commission."

Chapter 9, "Staff Relations, Efficiency and Discipline", contains much useful material relating to staff relations, negotiating machinery, trade unions, discipline, confidential reports and the organization and methods section of

the government machine. Mr. Adu thinks that the elaborate negotiating machinery (based on the United Kingdom Whitley Council system) introduced during the period of British government is too cumbersome and slow for modern conditions in Africa, and will have to be replaced by some simpler arrangement which will ensure consultations with the staff on matters in which they have a legitimate interest, but will not impede the expeditious settlement of business.

Chapter 11, "The Policy Making Process" is fascinating, and clearly written by a person with inside experience. The relations between Ministers and senior civil servants are frankly discussed, and the manner in which the senior civil servant participates in the formation of policy well described.

Chapter 12, "Financial Control" describes the budget process, the control of expenditure by the Treasury, the functions of the Audit Department, the Public Accounts Committee and ministry accounting officers. This chapter will be particularly helpful to people newly entering the civil service in Africa.

Chapter 13, "Other Public Services" covers the armed forces, the police, prisons and preventive services, the judiciary and the teaching service. Chapter 14, "Service Standards and Traditions", discusses the civil servant's dual loyalty to the state and to the government of the day, political activity of civil servants, and the civil servants' obligation to the public.

The book is well written in plain straightforward English, save for one regrettable Americanism ("personnel counselling") on page 147. I heartily recommend the book to all who are interested in Africa, particularly those who have been or are employed in the civil service.

CHARLES HARTWELL.

THE NIGERIAN LAW OF EVIDENCE, by G. R. Rudd, *London: Butterworths*, 1964; pp. xxviii and 245 and (index) 16; 55s. 6d.

As the author makes clear in his preface, this book is intended to serve a number of purposes. It is primarily a commentary on the Nigerian law of evidence, which is for the most part contained in the Nigerian Evidence Act of 1943, an act based on Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence. It is also intended to provide the basic principles of the law of evidence for those not already acquainted with the English law on this subject. Thirdly, the book endeavours to answer the needs of officers of the Nigerian Police Force who require information on matters such as exhibits and identification parades.

It would be surprising if a book which was intended to meet such diverse requirements did not suffer from a certain lack of cohesion and sense of direction, and the author is to be congratulated on having dealt so successfully with the difficult task he has set himself. After three introductory chapters on the judicial system in Nigeria and on the meaning of evidence and of proof, the reader is, in the fourth chapter, launched upon the relevancy sections of the Evidence Act. The following chapters on burden and quantum of proof, hearsay, witnesses and documentary evidence, then take the reader over the ground covered by the rest of the Act. In these chapters, however, the author does not attempt to follow the sequence of the Act but rather uses sections of the Act to illustrate a more general description of the subject matter. Of the advantages and disadvantages which this entails, the general reader will most probably find that the former considerably outweigh the latter. It will, for example, un-

doubtedly be more convenient and, indeed, more logical, for the reader to find the hearsay rule and the exceptions to it, with a detailed discussion on admissions and confessions, in a chapter on this subject rather than, as in the Act, to have this material tucked away under the general heading of relevance. The final chapter deals with methods of obtaining evidence, an account of the conduct of a trial and a note on submission. Throughout the book, the material presented is well illustrated with cases from West Africa and England.

This book is not merely a most readable and competent presentation of the law of evidence in Nigeria, of the relevancy and admissibility of facts and the method of proving those facts, but it will also prove a most useful practical guide for students, lawyers and police. Furthermore, its relevance is not entirely confined to Nigeria since in East Africa, for example, the evidence legislation is either the Indian Evidence Act or local statutes based on it, and these possess, in Fitzjames Stephen, a common parent with the Nigerian Act.

H. F. Morris.

GHANA LAND LAW: AN EXPOSITION, ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE, by Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill. *Sweet & Maxwell, London; and African Universities Press, Lagos*, 1964; pp. 408 and xxv; £3 12s. 6d.

This book is a detailed study and analysis of the land law of Ghana, both statutory and customary. The author's thesis is that the customary land law is "essentially viable and worthy to be retained as the foundation of the system of land law in Ghana". He recognizes, however, that this indigenous law now exists side by side with the common law, that this duality is undesirable, and must eventually lead to one uniformly applicable system. The analysis in the book is thus aimed at "clearing the avenues for a unified system applicable throughout the land".

The book is divided into four parts. Part I (Introductory) attempts to place the land law in its jurisprudential context and in the context of the traditional institutions in which it operates. Thus, the function of social and political authorities, e.g., "the family", "the clan", "the stool", the "oman", in relation to the indigenous land law is explained. The effect of British rule on land titles is also briefly discussed.

Part II (Original and Inherited Interests in Land) is an outline and discussion of the interests in land recognized under customary law and English law as applied in Ghana, and also of the customary and statutory law relating to testate and intestate succession. There is also a chapter devoted to "Family Property" and extinction of interests in land.

Part III (Controls and Facilities) has two chapters, one dealing with modern state machinery for controlling land used (e.g., minerals, forest reserves, town and country planning, rent control) and the other with the machinery for ascertaining title security, e.g., registration.

Finally, Part IV (Inter Vivos Dealings in Land) deals with land transactions such as sales, gifts and mortgages.

The great value of this book is that it is the first – at least in the "Law in Africa" series published by Sweet and Maxwell – to tackle both the customary and statutory law pertaining to one topic, in this case land law, in one volume. Its predecessors, e.g., Ollennu's *Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana*, or Okonkwo's and Naish's *Criminal Law in Nigeria*, were devoted to tackling either

the statutory law or the customary law. Not only that, but the author of this book goes further and deals with the interaction of the customary and statutory land law and suggests solutions to the conflictual problems that arise between them. To that extent, Dr. Bentsi-Enchill has certainly "cleared the avenue" to a unified system of land law in Ghana. The materials, whether deriving from writings on customary law, statutory provisions, or case law on the subject, are critically analyzed and competently dealt with.

EUGENE COTRAN.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GHANA, by J. K. Nsarkoh. *Ghana University Press, Accra*, 1964; pp. 309; 21s.

Two lines of approach may be taken in a study of local government – either the purely descriptive, or that of analyzing the problems present in the system. Mr. Nsarkoh has sought in his book to combine these two approaches with varying degrees of success.

The present system of local government in Ghana is based on the Greenwood Report of 1957[1], and on the subsequent Local Government Act of 1961. In his Report, Mr. Greenwood analyzed the system as it then was, and made suggestions for alterations. These included the amalgamation of a number of smaller councils into larger units, and changes in the finances and functions of local councils. One would hope, therefore, from this book, to get an up-to-date picture of the state of local government, and the success or otherwise of changes made since 1957, but it is disappointing to find that Mr. Nsarkoh appears to have written his book some time around 1961, with the result that it suffers from tardy publication. There is, however, little indication that he has studied any figures other than those given in the Greenwood Report. The only tables of more recent date are one on subventions to local councils for the years 1960-61 and 1961-62, and one on population. This latter shows a startling rise in population from the figures given in Schedule D (which were taken from the Greenwood Report), and the questions on rate payment and services to which this increase gives rise go unanswered. More unfortunate, however, than the absence of up-to-date figures is the use of the Greenwood Report which is not only confusing but could be misleading. In some cases it is quoted with a clear indication that it is the 1957 Report; in others, it is incorporated into the text with no acknowledgement, and quoted in the present tense. On page 24, for example, reference is made to a new collection of rates, amounting to 25 per cent. in the majority of council areas. This appears to be a transcription, from page 9 of the Greenwood Report, of the 1957 position, with "North Ghana" substituted for "Northern Territories". On page 43, the statement on the cost of education is apparently taken verbatim from page 21 of the Report.

There are further instances of apparent confusion between past and present, and little is said about the present financial position of local councils. It is not possible to find, for example, the present breakdown of revenue between grants, rates and other sources, nor the changes in revenue structure effected since 1957. The figures on page 78 for the amounts paid in percentage grants are the same as those given on page 19 of the Greenwood Report for the 1957 position. The

[1] See page 22, *J.L.A.O.*, Vol. XI, No. 1, Jan. 1959.

situation may not have altered, but by page 78 doubt is left in the readers' mind on the accuracy of the figures.

On the practical or working application of local government, he is on much surer ground, and here, in the sections on the workings of local government finance, the duties of principal officers, office organization, and procedure in council and committee, the book contains much which will be of use to staff and councillors alike.

A. St. J. Hannigan.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN TROPICAL AFRICA, edited by J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg, Jr. *University of California Press*, 1964; pp. xiii and 730; 80s.

The editors are both Professors in the Political Science Faculty of the University of California; the former is also Director of the University's African Studies Centre. The first chapters of the book deal with the one-party system in various African states, with articles on Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Cameroun, Guinea, Mali and Ghana. Then follows a series of analyses of non-party groups which are the object of political control, such as trade unions, traditional rulers and students. The final chapters deal with political parties and national integration. There is a very full bibliography and index.

PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW, by G. Ezejiofor. *London, : Butterworths*, 1964; pp. xix and 292; 55s.

In this book, Dr. Ezejiofor, who is Lecturer in Law at the University of Lagos, traces the development of the concept of Human Rights from pre-Christian times down to the declarations of the League of Nations and the United Nations. He then reviews the position in "old" and "new" Commonwealth countries and assesses the future of civil liberties in these countries.

ENTWICKLUNGSBANKEN UND-GESELLSCHAFT IN TROPISCH AFRIKA, by N. Ahmad and E. Becher. *Springer-Verlag, Berlin and New York*, 1964; pp. 86; 12 D/marks.

This is the first title in an impressive list which has been or will be published by the African Studies Centre in Munich, West Germany. Titles in print or in preparation include works on Economics, Agriculture, Commerce and Sociology, all with reference to Africa. Some of the studies will appear in French or English, the rest in German. This first title, printed only in German, is an exhaustive list of Development Banks and Companies in tropical Africa.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TANGANYIKA, by H. Ruthenburg. *Springer-Verlag, Berlin and New York*, 1964; pp. 212 and map. 28 D/marks.

The second title in the African Studies Centre's series has been translated into English. Starting with a survey of agriculture's role in the development of Tanganyika's economy, the author goes on to consider policy under British administration and the changes brought about by independence. There are also chapters on development aid to agriculture and on modern husbandry methods.

MONEY AND FINANCE IN AFRICA, by E. E. Jucker-Fleetwood. *Allen & Unwin*, 1964; pp. 335; 45s.

Mrs. Jucker-Fleetwood is on the staff of the Basle Centre for Economic and Financial Research, and her book describes the problems faced and the solutions found by the monetary and financial authorities of six African countries, viz.: Ghana, Morocco, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (as it was then), the Sudan and Tunisia. The specific problem of the monetary and financial policy in emerging countries is treated in relation to development plans and the balance of payments.

MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, by S. S. Khera. *Asia Publishing House, London*, 1964; pp. 270; 30s.

Mr. Khera writes with the authority of thirty-six years experience in the Indian Civil Service, and is also the author of two previous works, *District Administration in India* and *Government in Business*. His latest book is, indeed, an abridged version of the latter of these. A study of state enterprises in India, it examines the management of public undertakings with special reference to their "upper echelons" – the boards of directors and chief executives. Mr. Khera's long association with such undertakings, and with Statutory Corporations, enables him to write the book with considerable skill and knowledge.

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON ATTITUDES IN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT, by M. J. Campbell. *Institute of Administration, Zaria, N. Nigeria*; pp. 20.

This workmanlike little booklet is a summary of a Conference sponsored jointly by the Zaria Institute, the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of Pittsburgh University, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. It lists the aims of the Conference and summarises members' deliberations in an easily readable form.

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